College student removed from flight after speaking Arabic on plane

[Boiler 46,364]

Please reference your "studies"

Pro-Tip: News articles, commentary , drudge reports and polls do not meet any bar that I would consider a study.

VJ?

Has been covered here more times than I can remember.

[Rob L 3,811]

VJ?

Has been covered here more times than I can remember.

I have yet to see studies on this.

[Rob L 3,811]

In case you were looking for examples of a real study on Terrorism here is an example :

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/264/html

Exploring Support for Terrorism Among Muslims

by Adrian Cherney and Jenny Povey

Abstract

In this paper we examine factors that influence support for terrorism, using the PEW 2010 Global Attitudes Survey. We assess aggregate results, drawing on items fielded to all Muslim respondents to identify broad factors that appear to indicate likely support for suicide terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that being female, having an educational degree, a commitment to certain Muslim beliefs and values, and being a member of the Shi’a minority might be probable indicators of support for terrorism. Some of the results were also counterintuitive. We consider the implications of our findings for understanding passive and active support for terrorism among Muslim communities.

Introduction

The question of Muslim support for Islamist-inspired terrorism has generated a public and political debate as to whether support for terrorism is rooted in Muslim religiosity and faith, particularly through the concept of jihad, which is sometimes interpreted as providing justification for violence against civilians.[1]Scholars have challenged such views, arguing that it distorts Islamic beliefs and principles.[2] In addition, empirical research has shed light on the complexity of attitudinal support for terrorism among Muslims, with some studies indicating it is shaped by a range of factors, least of which necessarily relate to religiosity or Islamic faith[3].

Given the saliency of the issue, it is important that debates and policies on terrorism are anchored in an informed understanding about why some Muslims may have sympathy and support for terrorism. This is not an insignificant issue because, as Sageman argues, the fight against terrorists groups such Al-Qaeda, is largely about winning over the “hearts and minds” of Muslim communities.[4] Doing so requires an understanding of the content of Muslim beliefs as well as factors that shape such attitudes.[5] Also examining support for terrorism can provide insights into whether terrorism is tolerated by co-religious groups. Such implicit support might be able to provide a “cloak of legitimacy” for terrorists and their causes, providing fertile ground for radicalisation, allowing terrorists to conduct operations more frequently and with greater ease.

Research on support for terrorism within Muslim-dominated countries has mainly relied on public polling survey data.[6] There are methodological limitations with such public polling data[7]; one needs to be careful with concluding that results translate into an accurate measure of active support for terrorism itself. Despite this caveat, such polling data can provide a useful proxy for measuring passive support for Islamist-inspired terrorism (i.e. ideological or attitudinal), given the challenges of conducting large-scale survey work on terrorism.[8]

In this article we examine support for terrorism among Muslims using data from the 2010 PEW Global Attitudes survey (the most recent available PEW data at the time of writing). Our aim is to contribute to the growing understanding about what influences Muslim support for terrorism and examine if there are any significant commonalities. It has been argued that the content of people’s beliefs about salient issues can be quite uniform, with this being the case for groups of particular religious orientations.[9] The PEW global attitudes survey consists of a twenty-two-nation survey conducted in April and May 2010.[10] The survey specifically includes countries that are predominantly Muslim (e.g. Indonesia and Pakistan), or countries with large Muslim minorities. The PEW survey collects data on socio-economic indicators, but also asks questions on a range of social, political and religious issues, including whether Muslim respondents judge suicide terrorism as justifiable (used as the dependent variable measure of support for terrorism in this study). Not all survey items are fielded to all respondents; there is some variation in the types of questions asked across countries e.g. relating to attitudes towards national political issues. Previous published research on support for terrorism among Muslims has relied on earlier PEW datasets than the one drawn on in this article. Such research has mainly examined variations between Muslim countries when it comes to, for example, the link between socio-economic conditions and support for terrorism.[11] In this article we look at overall aggregate results, and draw on particular items that were asked of all Muslim respondents. This will ensure consistency across the sample and increase our overall sample size. We do recognise that such an analysis can obscure variations between groups of respondents, but our aim is to identify general consistencies across Muslim respondents. In the next section we outline the method underpinning this study and describe our different variables, providing a justification for their selection and relevance to judgments about terrorism. Results from a logistic regression model are then presented and discussed. We then discuss the implications of our results and conclude by contemplating what our results mean for understanding passive and active support for terrorism.

Current Study and Survey Items

Data

As stated, this article employs data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2010. Although this dataset represents a very general survey of respondents in 22 countries across the globe (n=24,790), this analysis draws specifically on the data from 7 countries that are classified in the Pew dataset as Muslim dominated, namely: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey; together they comprised 8,003 respondents. More specifically, the analysis uses the data of respondents who are Muslim in these Muslim countries. The final dataset used for the analyses comprised of 6,998 respondents.

Dependent Variable:

All Muslims in Muslim countries were asked the following question: Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified? Responses to this question comprise the outcome variable in this analyses. Responses ranged from one through to four (1 = “Often Justified,” 2 = “Sometimes Justified,” 3 = “Rarely Justified,” and 4 = “Never Justified.”). For purposes of descriptive statistics, this variable was recoded such that higher values indicate higher levels of support for this tactic. Thus, upon recoding, this variable took the values of: 4 = “Often Justified,” 3 = “Sometimes Justified,” 2 = “Rarely Justified,” and 1 = “Never Justified.” For purposes of the regression analysis only, this measure was recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = Never Justified and 1 = Ever Justified) and analysed by using logistic regression.

Independent Variables:

Studies on support for terrorism have generally categorised variables that impact on levels of support under five broad headings: social and demographic factors; economic and political factors; Islamic commitment and faith; institutional and political trust and foreign policy positions.[12] While we were limited in the number of variables we could include in our model, given the fact that we only selected items asked across all Muslim respondents, we have aimed to include items that in one way or another tap into factors across these five topic areas.

Important demographic variables such as “sex” (male = 0, female = 1), “age” (continuous 18–85) and “marital status” (all other = 0, married = 1) were included in the model due to the fact that the conventional wisdom is that young, unmarried males are the most likely candidates for participating in a terrorist campaign.[13] However, it should be noted that 71 percent of the respondents were married. While males and females were equally represented (50% for both), 69 percent of the male respondents were married and so were 73 percent of the women. The model also included employment status (unemployed = 0, employed = 1), children under 18 years living at home (no children =1, 1-3 children =2, 4 or more children = 3), and education (incomplete secondary or less =1, complete secondary = 2, complete tertiary =3).

Six indices were created and included in our model as independent variables. The items used in each index were determined by factor analyses, with each index comprising a 1-factor solution. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for these independent variables are presented in Table 1.

The Religious Extremism index is comprised of two items tapping how concerned respondents were with, firstly the rise of extremism in their own country and, secondly the rise of extremism in the world. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = concerned and 1 = not concerned). The index religious extremism is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The aim here is to understand how certain political and ideological positions influence support for terrorism, the assumption being that Muslims concerned about religious extremism are more likely to reject terrorism than those that do not.

The Conservative Muslim index is comprised of four items, tapping whether respondents are in favour or oppose making each of the following items law in their country: (1) segregation of men and women in the workplace; (2) punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery; (3) stoning people who commit adultery; and (4) death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = oppose and 1 = favour). The indexConservative Muslim is comprised of the mean score for these four items. The reason for including this item is that arguments have been presented that fundamentalist Muslim values and beliefs influence support for terrorism, promoted in particular through the “clash of civilisations” thesis and arguments that literal and narrow interpretations of Islamic doctrine are antithetical to Western secular values.[14] Bernard argues that Muslim fundamentalists reject democratic values and desire an authoritarian state that implements Islamic law and morality. [15] This allegedly leads to sympathy for violent acts that aim to defend Islam, such as suicide terrorism.[16]

The empirical reality of such positions needs to be tested so as to ensure there is an informed debate about what might generate support for terrorism. Similar propositions led us to select the next two variables - Women shouldn’t have rights and Religious observance variables. The Women shouldn’t have rights index is comprised of two items, tapping agreement or disagreement to two statements regarding women’s rights (1) women should have the right to decide whether or not they wish to wear a veil; and (2) women should be able to work outside the home. The responses were recoded as a dichotomous variable (0 = agree and 1 = disagree). This index is comprised of the mean score for these two items. The Religious Observance index is comprised of two items, observance to pray and fasting, with each item measured on a different frequency scale. How frequently a respondent prayed was measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to five times a day. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-4 = 0) and religious observance (codes 5-7 = 1). How frequently a respondent fasted was measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from hardly ever to always during Ramadan and other religious holidays. This item was recoded into occasional observance (codes 1-2 = 0) and religious observance (codes 3-4 = 1). The index religious observance is comprised of the mean score for these two items.

Dissatisfaction with US foreign policy and its perceived injustices towards Muslims is also argued as potentially being relevant to why some Muslims may support terrorism. [17] There have been efforts to shift such perceptions by the current US administration [18] and in this regard we included an Obama International Policy index, comprised of six items tapping the approval or disapproval of the way President Barack Obama deals with the following six issues: (1) international policies; (2) the world economic crisis; (3) the situation in Afghanistan; (4) Iran; (5) the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians; (6) the situation in Iraq. The responses were recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = disapprove and 1 = approve). The index Obama International Policy is comprised of the mean score for these six items.

The link between poverty and terrorism is a popular explanation for the root causes of terrorism. However, it has been discredited by a number of studies. [19] Other explanations point to assessments of societal or national well-being as more relevant to influencing support for terrorism, via judgments about one’s societal, economic and political circumstances.[20] Hence it is more about relative, than absolute deprivation that matters when influencing approval for terrorist attacks. While not a perfect measure of this issue, we included an Economic and Political Situation in one’s own Country index, comprised of three items. The items were recoded as dichotomous variables (0 = good and 1 = bad) and tap (1) how respondents feel things are going in their country; (2) the current economic situation in their country; (3) how good a job their government is doing in dealing with the economy. The index Economic and Political Situation in one’s own Country is comprised of the mean score for these three items.

Six other dummy variables were used in the model: member of Sunni or Shi’a Muslim group; importance of religion; the role of political Islam; whether there is a struggle between modernists and fundamentalists; tension between Sunnis and Shia’s seen as a problem; and US military threat to your country.

Data Analysis and Results

The dependent variable (support for terrorism) is measured dichotomously. A binary logistic regression (LR) model was used to explore a number of possible predictors while including a number of control variables. The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 2. Among the demographic variables explored in this model (age, gender, marital status, children in the household, education), only gender and educational status turned out to be significant. These results suggest that the likelihood of a Muslim woman supporting terrorism, compared to a Muslim man, was approximately one fourth (22%). Muslims with graduate or post-graduate qualifications were 28 percent more likely to support terrorism than those who had not completed secondary schooling.

Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism, women shouldn’t have rights, religious observance, and Obama’s international policy. These indices are continuous, thus the odds ratio refers to a unit change, more specifically a unit denotes 1 for each of the six indices. Muslims who are not concerned with the rise of extremism in their own country and the world are 61 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who are concerned. Muslims who do not support women’s rights to wear a veil or work outside the home are 15 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do support Muslim women to have such rights. Muslims who actively observe religious rituals such as praying and fasting are 44 percent more likely to support terrorism than Muslims that occasionally observe these religious rituals. Muslims who approve of the way President Barack Obama deals with various international policy issues are 53 per cent more (sic!) likely to support terrorism than Muslims who disapprove of the way he deals with these issues. Members of the Shi’a Muslim group are 109 per cent more likely to support terrorism than members of the Sunni Muslim group.

Two variables had a negative relationship with terrorism support, such as: perceived struggle between modernists and fundamentalists and tension between Sunni’s and Shi’a’s in the Muslim world is not seen as a problem. Muslims who perceive there to be a struggle in their country between groups who want to modernize the country and Islamic fundamentalists, are 23 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who do not think there is a struggle between these factions. Muslim's who indicated that the tension between Sunni and Shi’a is not a problem, are 48 per cent less likely to support terrorism than Muslims who indicated that the tension between these groups is a problem.

Discussion and Conclusion

In summary: among the demographic variables explored in this model only gender and educational status turned out to be important. Four of the six indices were significant predictors for support of terrorism: religious extremism seen as a problem, women shouldn’t have rights to choose to wear a veil or work outside the home, religious observance, and Obama’s international policy.

The Obama international policy result was somewhat counter-intuitive, in that despite approving of how US President Obama was dealing with various international policy issues, some Muslim respondents still reported they supported terrorists’ acts. Hence, while perceptions may be improving among Muslims about how the US might be addressing certain political issues, this may not translate into attitudinal opposition against terrorism – which is a central aim of US attempts to win the “hearts and minds” of people in Muslim-dominated countries.[21] This conundrum maybe the outcome of other factors that have not been measured here, such as the historical legacy of US foreign policy decisions or the perceived victimisation of Muslims by local and foreign governments, that maybe more difficult to shift despite the efforts of one well-intentioned US president.

One of the more significant factors influencing support for terrorism was being a member of the Shi’a Muslim group as opposed to Sunni. One explanation for this is that our dependent variable measure of support for terrorism (justification of suicide bombing) potentially taps into beliefs about martyrdom, which have a strong tradition and legacy among Shi’a Muslims, and have been identified as promoting support for radicalisation and Islamic fundamentalism among Shi’ite minorities.[22] However, the validity of such results would need to be verified by additional data gathered from Muslim communities that having sizeable Shi’a populations, such as India, Bahrain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Our results indicate that neither economic and political judgments, nor low levels of formal education appear to influence support for terrorism, raising doubt about the link between socio-economic conditions and the perceived legitimacy of terrorists acts.[23] Two particular results are worth stressing here: (i) the fact that particular values (attitudes on women’s rights – i.e. wearing the veil and working outside the home) and (ii) religious divisions (i.e. identifying as a Shi’a Muslim) did influence support for terrorism.

The implications of these results can be interpreted in a number of ways. One would be to conclude – as many political leaders and media commentators do – that the results show there is something inherently conservative and fundamentalist about Islam that generates support for violent jihad and antipathy towards Western secular values. It follows then that one solution lies in policy responses that promote a “moderate” form of Islam that encourages tolerance and a more liberal interpretation of the Quran. This is problematic, because it should not be up to governments to dictate what form of Islam Muslim people should follow – they should be free to decide for themselves. This does not mean that normative values derived from belief systems among Muslims should not be contended with or challenged when aiming to combat terrorism – the question is how can this be done in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities. This is important to consider because there is an intense debate among Muslims and Islamic scholars as to how elements of the Quran should be interpreted, for instance around the meaning of jihad [24]. Hence while there may be uniformity in the saliency of certain Islamic beliefs (e.g. jihad as a moral and spiritual battle) it does not mean that this will be expressed in similar ways i.e. used to legitimise violence.

Perhaps one solution lies in recognising the types of “sacred values” that underpin Muslim beliefs.[25] Sacred values are morally generated positions that produce devotion to core principles such as the importance of family, country, religion, honour, justice and collective identity. While they can often have their basis in religion, they can also be derived from core secular values e.g. fairness and reciprocity.[26] What is important is that sacred values drive behaviour in ways that trump individual calculations of self-interest. As Atran and colleagues have argued and shown, the most intractable political disputes and extreme behaviours are the outcome of sacred values, such as those underlying the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.[27] Our results are potentially the manifestation of the impact of sacred values on support for terrorism, namely Shi’a beliefs that have traditionally celebrated martyrdom as a sacred duty and beliefs relating to the female Muslim duty to wear the hijab and remain within the home. Rather than criticise such values or rail against their manifestation, a more productive response is to recognise their inviolability and respect the right of Muslims to have such beliefs, because this can actually lead to concessions on the behalf of those that hold such values.[28] The problem is that this is something that Western governments and their constituencies have found difficult to do when it comes to addressing the problem of terrorism. Our results show that what drives support for terrorism is multifaceted, and that shifting the “hearts and minds” of Muslims about the legitimacy of terrorism must reflect this complexity in a way that does not isolate Muslim communities.

About the authors: Adrian Cherney is a senior lecturer in Criminology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland. He holds a PhD in Criminology from the University of Melbourne. One major focus of his work is on institutional legitimacy and cooperation with authorities, e.g. police and government. He is currently undertaking research on community cooperation in counter-terrorism. He can be reached at < a.cherney@uq.edu.au >. Jenny Povey is a research psychologist and fellow in the Institute of Social Science Research, at the University of Queensland. She has experience in test construction, survey development and evaluative research and holds a PhD from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in South Africa.

Notes

[1] See C. Bernard (2004). 'Five pillars of democracy: How the West can promote an Islamic reformation'. Rand Spring Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 10-13.http://www.rand.org /publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/pillars.html (accessed on Nov 7, 2012); S. Huntington. (1996) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster; R. Jackson, (2007) ‘Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse’, Government and Opposition, 42: 394–426. B. Lewis (1990) ‘The roots of Muslim rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West and why their bitterness will not be easily mollified’. Atlantic Monthly, 266 (September); pp. 47-60.

[2] J.L. Esposito (2011) What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, 2nd Edition, Oxford: University Press. Scholars similarly point out that Islamic fundamentalism also distort Islamic principles to justify their actions. For instance Hafez (2010) argues that Islamic extremists utilize tactics of redefining social identities, so that some Muslims are no longer considered members of the protected in-group, justifying the use of violence against fellow Muslims (which is in violation of the Quran). By focusing teachings on the meaning and importance of piety, Jihadi Salafists use accusations of apostasy as a means of legitimising attacks on other Muslims. – M.M. Hafez (2010). ‘The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Jihadi Salafism and Debates over Suicide Bombings in the Muslim World’, Asian Journal of Social Science, 38, pp. 364-378.

[3] G. Blair, N. Malhorta and J.N. Shapiro. (2013) ‘Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan’, America Journal of Political Science, 57 (1), pp. 30-48; G. Chiozza (2011) ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: The Political Sociology of Popular Support for Suicide Bombings’, Working Paper, Vanderbilt University; C.C. Fair and B. Shepherd (2006) ‘Who Supports Terrorism: Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, pp. 51-74; C.C. Fair, N. Malhotra,and J.N. Shapiro (2012). ‘Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 76 (4), pp. 688-720; J. Ginges, I. Hansen and A. Norenzayan (2009) ‘Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks’, Psychological Science 20 (2), pp. 224-230; K. Kaltenenthaler, W.J. Miller, S. Ceccoli and R. Gelleny (2010). ‘The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes towards Religiously Motivated Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (9), pp. 815-835; S. Haddad and J.H. Khashan (2002). ‘Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim and Views on September 11’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (6), pp. 812-828; J. Jo (2011) ‘Who Sympathizes with Osama bin Laden? Revisiting the Hearts and Minds of Pakistani and Indonesian Muslim People’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, advanced access, first published on-line 15 Dec. 2011; G. LaFree, and N.A. Morris (2012). ‘Does Legitimacy Matter? Attitudes Towards Anti-American Violence in Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia’, Crime and Delinquency 58 (5), pp. 689-719; M. Mousseau (2011). ‘Urban Poverty and Support for Islamist Terror: Survey Results of Muslims in Fourteen Countries’, Journal of Peace Research 48 (1), pp. 35–47; J.N. Shapiro and C.C. Fair (2009). ‘Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, International Security 34 (3), pp. 79-118.

[4] M. Sageman (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; see also: S. Atran (2003). ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, Science, 299 (5612), pp. 1534-1539.

[5] C.C. Fair, N. Malhotra, and J.N. Shapiro (2012); Q. Wiktorowicz (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

[6] E.g. see Fair and Shepherd (2006); Kaltenenthaler et al 2010. Haddad and Khashan 2002 op cit. ;Jo (2011) op cit.; C. McCauley and S. Scheckter (2011). ‘Reactions to the War on Terrorism: Origin- Group Differences in the 2007 Pew Poll of U.S. Muslims’. Perspectives on Terrorism, 5 (1), pp. 38-54; M. Mousseau (2011); Shafiq, M.N. and A.H. Sinno (2010) ‘Education, Income and Support for Suicide Bombing: Evidence from Six Muslims Countries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (1), pp 146-178; Shapiro and Fair (2009); Tessler, M. and Robbins, M.D.H. (2007) “What Leads Some Ordinary Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (2), pp. 305-328.

[7] W. Bullock, K. Imai and J.N. Shapiro (2011). ‘Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan’, Political Analysis 19, pp. 363-384. Blair, Fair, Malhorta and Shapiro (2013); Fair, Malhotra and J.N. Shapiro (2012).

[8] Ramsey (2012) ‘Public Opinion Research and Evidence-Based Counterinsurgency’, in: C. Lum and L.W. Kennedy (Eds.), Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy, 301 Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, pp. 301-342. Also the public availability of such polling data, e.g. the PEW Global Attitudes survey (see http://www.pewglobal.org) does provide capacity for researchers to examine attitudes towards terrorism using large data sets, particularly in situations where large scale survey work is financially inhibitive.

[9] S. Atran (2002) In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Oxford University Press, New York. A. Scott, and J. Henrich. "The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions." Biological Theory Integrating Development, Evolution, and Cognition, 5 (1), pp. 18-30.

[10] See http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/2010/.

[11] E.g. Fair and Shepherd (2006); Jo (2011); McCauley and Scheckter (2011).

[12] See Paul (2010), op. cit.

[13] Tessler and Robbins (2007), op. cit.

[14]Bernard (2004), op. cit; S. Huntington (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[15] Bernard (2004), op. cit.

[16] Tessler and Robbins (2007).

[17] G.L. Bowen. (2011) ‘Has outreach to the Muslim world by the Obama administration had an impact on Muslim attitudes toward terrorists and terrorism?’ Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs Journal, 15 (1),; G. Kepel (2004); B. Lewis (1990).

[18] Bowen (2011), op. cit.

[19] E.g. Krueger (2007), op. cit.

[20] Tessler and Robbins (2007), op. cit.

[21] Bowen (2011), op. cit.

[22] J. Esposito (2011); B. Hoffman (1995) ‘Holy terror”: The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 18 (4), pp. 271-284; R. Israeli (2002). ‘A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 14 (4) , pp. 23-40.

[23] See J. Piazza. (2006) ‘Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:1, pp.159-177.

[24] J. Zeidan (2001) "The Islamic Fundamentalists View of Life as a Perennial Battle", Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5 (4), pp. 26-53.

[25] See S. Atran, op. cit; S. Axelrod and R. Davis (2007). ‘Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution”, Science, 317, pp. 1039-1040; S. Atran and R. Axelrod (2008). ‘Reframing Sacred Values’, Negotiation Journal, 24 (3), pp. 221-246.

[26] S. Atran and S. Axelrod (2008), op. cit.

[27] See Atran, Axelrod and Davis (2007), op. cit.

[28] Ibid.

[Merrytooth 5,748]

WOT

[Rob L 3,811]

Here is another study example:

\

ESTIMATES ON THE GLOBAL THREAT OF ISLAMIC STATE TERRORISM IN THE FACE OF THE 2015 PARIS AND COPENHAGEN ATTACKS

JULY 13, 2015 BY ARNO TAUSCH

Click here for PDF

This article estimates the probable conflict intensity in connection with Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS and ISIL) terrorism. Based on Pew data, covering 2/5 of the global Muslim population, it is estimated that 17.38 percent of Muslims worldwide openly express terror sympathies (five terrorism support indicators used). Quantitative estimates on terror support rates for a number of additional countries are also provided, based on European Social Survey (ESS) data and their statistical relationship to Pew data. Also evaluated is Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey data on Islamic State support in eight Arab countries and territories.

Nothing will be the same in the European debate about Islamism following the January and February 2015 Paris and Copenhagen attacks. The Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))[1] has been making advances in much of Syria and Iraq.[2] In addition, there has been an influx of thousands of “foreign fighters” into the region–including from Europe.[3] This context would thus seem to necessitate a serious analysis of global Islamist terror support among Muslim populations worldwide.

In the current global debate about the subject, there are those who warn against “alarmism.” Professor Charles Kurzman writes that, in effect, with more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire martyrdom, one does not see as many terrorist attacks as would be expected from opinion surveys.[4] Out of the 140,000 murders in the United States since the September 11 attacks, Islamist terrorists have killed, Kurzman argues, at most “only” three dozen people. He adds that of the 150,000 people who die each day worldwide, Islamist militants account for less than 50 fatalities. In a January 2015 statement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed the issue in a similar vein. He warned that “the European Union… should crack down on Islamophobia amid rising anti-Muslim protests rather than ‘trying to teach a lesson’ to Turkey.”[5]

In view of the lacking survey data on IS support among Muslims worldwide,[6] and in order to determine the probable rates of support for terror among the European and global Muslim populations, the current study employs a “forensic sociology” approach.[7] As of the writing of this article, only the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies[8] has published limited field research on IS support in eight Arab countries and territories. In the United Kingdom,[9] a poll of 1,000 representative British Muslims, carried out by the COMRES Research Institute, revealed that while all Muslims living in Britain felt a loyalty to the country (95 percent), 6 percent said they felt a disloyalty, one in four (27 percent) British Muslims said they had some sympathy for the motives behind the attacks in Paris, and one in nine (11 percent) British Muslims felt sympathetic toward people who want to fight against Western interests, while 85 percent did not. As of yet, there have been no other comparable surveys available on Muslim opinions about IS, let alone multivariate analyses.[10] For the time being, one is left with no choice but to look for reliable proxy variables from other surveys in the Muslim world. Estimating the probable degree of support for IS in developed, Western democracies is an even more difficult task.

Despite the limited available data, standard and fairly reliable Pew public opinion survey data on a number of Muslim communities across the globe do exist and shed some light on the question of support for terror among these communities. This perhaps could be a good starting point. At any rate, it is very plausible that someone who supports, say, the Taliban, would also support IS. The Pew surveys address at least 42 percent of the global Muslim population and their rates of sympathy for such terrorist groups as Hamas, Hizballah, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida as well as their identification with suicide bombings, even when innocent civilians are killed.

At the very least, the average rates of terror support based on these five variables could be regarded as a good and valid starting point to estimate the probable degree of support for Islamic State terror.

For the majority of non-Muslim countries, this study relies on European Social Survey (ESS) data on overall Muslim alienation in order to predict Muslim support for terrorism. Questionable as that may be, it is the only method available for making at least informed guesses regarding the magnitude of the problem Western security is now facing. There is quite a robust statistical relationship (of up to 70 percent) between the ESS data and Pew terror support data from core Western countries, thus allowing one to make at least some informed guesses regarding support for suicide bombings in those countries for which ESS but no Pew data is available. Thus, support for suicide bombings among European Muslims is predicted by using reliable data on European Muslim alienation. The public Pew data are an important element in the overall foreign country assessment of successive U.S. administrations.[11]

The article first presents the methodology followed by the Pew figures for terror support in key Muslim countries, representing more than 40 percent of the global Muslim population. Next, it analyzes the correlations of the statistically derived global IS support rates with standard structural and opinion data.[12] Also studied are the implications and the cross-national correlations of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey on IS support in eight countries and territories.

ANALYZING TERROR SYMPATHY

The Pew data analyzed in this article are from the following countries, which between them make up at least 42 percent of the total global Muslim population: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey.[13] Graphs 1 and Graph 2 highlight the research strategy employed:

Graph 1: Methodology to estimate Islamic State support in the Muslim world from openly available Pew data

The availability of relatively reliable European Social Survey[14] data on opinions and perspectives of Muslims in Europe from Muslim subsamples (usually n > 30) for Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom allows one to apply the following research strategy for the Western countries and for Russia:

Graph 2: Methodology to estimate Islamic State support in the European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Russia, and Israel from openly available European Social Survey data

The pivotal Pew survey question in this context[15] asks respondents about their position on suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets as being justified in order to “defend Islam from its enemies.”

Table 1 establishes the correlations between the Pew data on suicide bombing support and the European Social Survey data:

Table 1: Correlations between European Social Survey data on social alienation of Muslim communities in Western countries and Pew data on Muslim support for suicide bombing in five key Western countries (France, Germany, Israel, Spain, and United Kingdom)

Pearson correlation with suicide bombing data Pew Pearson correlation with suicide bombing data Pew ESS indicator % not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing % saying suicide bombing often/sometimes justified Very low trust in country’s parliament in % 0.780 0.235 Very low trust in the legal system in % 0.028 0.511 Very low trust in the police in % 0.841 0.250 Dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country 0.531 -0.097 Difficult or very difficult on present income 0.242 0.446

ISLAMIC STATE SUPPORT IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Average population weighted terror support rates from published Pew surveys on Muslim favorability of Hamas, Hizballah, the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and suicide bombing is 17.38 percent of all Muslims around the globe.[16] These results fit in with other data, based on surveys such as the World Values Survey.[17] The estimate might be lower than what right-wing populist politicians in many European countries would suggest, but still, the figure is very high, especially when considering the huge absolute numbers of persons expressing terror sympathy and terror support.[18]

The plausibility of these estimates emerges from Table 2 with the country results and the population weighted aggregate results. The survey data imply the following cascade of the acceptance of terrorism and violence among considerable global minority Muslim publics:

(1) % Unconcerned about Islamist extremism 33.850% (2) % at least not categorically rejecting suicide bombing 26.860% (3) % favoring Hamas 22.480% (4) % favoring Hizballah 21.060% (5) % favoring Taliban 16.990% (6) % favoring al-Qa’ida 16.410% (7) % saying suicide bombing often or sometimes justified 9.960% (8) implied percentage of Islamic State favorability (average from Indicators 3-7) 17.380%

Thus, support for suicide bombing terror among the following Muslim populations is as follows: 62 percent in the Palestinian territories, 33 percent in the Lebanon, 27 percent in Malaysia, and 25 percent in Egypt, etc.

On population-weighted averages, 17.38 percent of the entire Muslim population in the surveyed countries and territories support hard-core terrorist opinions, based on the five presented indicators. Without controlling for the age structure,[19] one could conclude that 295 million people globally, i.e. only slightly less than the current U.S. population (316 million), indeed support Islamist terror.

Table 2: The sociological landscape of Islamism and its supporters in the Muslim world according to representative 2014 Pew surveys–percentages of total Muslim population per country and globally population weighted averages

Egypt Indonesia Jordan Lebanon Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Palestinian Territories[20] Senegal Tunisia Turkey Population weighted average, Muslims of all countries (1) % Unconcerned about Islamist Extremism 28.0 48.0 45.0 26.0 18.0 21.0 18.0 33.0 19.0 27.0 51.0 33.85 (2) % at least not categorically rejecting suicide bombing 61.0 19.0 47.0 59.0 42.0 22.0 11.0 84.0 50.0 23.0 46.0 26.86 (3) % favoring Hamas 48.0 24.0 43.0 46.0 32.0 25.0 12.0 48.0 11.0 46.0 5.0 22.48 (4) % favoring Hezbollah 18.0 29.0 26.0 46.0 35.0 21.0 15.0 43.0 10.0 35.0 7.0 21.06 (5) % favoring Taliban 28.0 21.0 9.0 4.0 23.0 11.0 12.0 29.0 15.0 13.0 10.0 16.99 (6) % favoring al Qaeda 20.0 23.0 13.0 1.0 20.0 9.0 13.0 35.0 9.0 15.0 7.0 16.41 (7) % saying suicide bombing often or sometimes justified 25.0 6.0 12.0 33.0 27.0 8.0 3.0 62.0 18.0 12.0 16.0 9.96 (8) implied percentage of Islamic State favorability (average from Indicators 3-7) 27.8 20.6 20.6 26.0 27.4 14.8 11.0 43.4 12.6 24.2 9.0 17.38 percentage of the total population of the entire Muslim world 4.71 14.42 0.38 0.15 1.01 4.46 10.49 0.25 0.73 0.61 4.40 41.59%[21]

WHEN RADICALISM MEETS POVERTY

Public opinion surveys among the 19 million Muslims in the 28 European Union countries, who are expected to grow to 20 percent of the total EU population by 2050, by and large reveal a widespread rate of poverty combined with a rather lower rate of higher education, and–as European Social Survey data also show–they are far from embracing democracy in several–but not all–European Union countries.[22] Data for Israel, which is included in the European Social Survey project and which also has a sizable Muslim minority within its borders (according to the CIA World Factbook: Jewish population: 75.1 percent, Muslim population 17.4 percent, Christian 2 percent, Druze 1.6 percent, other 3.9 percent), [23] are also available.

Available scattered Pew data from 2014[24] have already indicated that 25 percent of Israeli Arabs hold a favorable view of Hizballah, and 24 percent of Israeli Arabs view Hamas favorably. In another Pew survey, from 2006, it was found that 8 percent of Muslims in Germany and 16 percent of Muslims in France, Spain, and the UK openly supported suicide bombing attacks, even against innocent civilians, to “defend, if necessary, Islam.” Following, additional data is discussed that may allow for a better understanding of poverty and alienation as a breeding ground for extremism. Readers are also referred to the evidence presented in the graphs and tables of the current study and in the data appendix available online.[25]

Graph 3 and Table 3 summarize the available European Social Survey evidence on poverty and the alienation of Muslims in Western countries. Of the 19,905 million Muslims in “Western Europe” (i.e., the EU-28, including French overseas territories, the European Economic Area (EEA), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries), some 83 percent of Muslims are represented in the European Social Survey data. On a population weighted basis, 39 percent of Western European Muslims are poor and 13 percent are alienated, underlining the fact that Muslim “integration” in Europe is more of a myth than a reality:

Graph 3: European and Israeli Muslims: Alienation from the political and social system

Table 3: Muslim poverty and Muslim alienation, ESS 2012 survey

% difficult or very difficult on present income % of the Muslim population severely alienated from society in 2012 (4 indicators) Switzerland 24.20 2.23 Norway 33.30 3.33 Sweden 54.10 5.10 Netherlands 50.00 6.60 Germany 31.50 6.75 Denmark 8.60 8.08 Belgium 49.10 8.98 United Kingdom 32.80 9.30 Israel 42.80 13.53 France 34.20 13.98 Spain 60.60 20.23 Slovenia 29.40 28.23 Russian Federation 57.90 28.80 Bulgaria 87.20 51.13

Tables 1, 2, and 3 further summarize the available data and estimates on the basis of the empirical relationships, established in this article. Map 1 summarizes and projects these results on a global level, while Map 2 shows the results for Europe:

Map 1: Implied or observed percentage of Muslims not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing

Map 2: Implied percentage of Muslims not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing–close-up for the Euro-Mediterranean region

In light of the evidence and calculations presented here, based on Pew and European Social Survey data, one could assume that in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Indonesia, Norway, Uzbekistan, Germany, Tunisia, and Pakistan less than 10 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings, while in Turkey, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Austria, Senegal, Spain, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, Jordan, Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands more than 10 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings. In Mali, Ghana, Uganda, Lebanon, Tanzania, Egypt, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Nigeria, and Kuwait, 20 to 50 percent of Muslims supported or likely supported suicide bombings. According to the Pew data, in the Palestinian Territories and Bangladesh, suicide bombing terror support was 50 percent or more of the entire adult population.[26] In the following Table, the countries for which data are only based on linear bivariate regression estimates from ESS data are highlighted. All the other data are direct and hard Pew survey results. The politometric estimates are based on the methodology presented in Graph 2 of this essay.

Table 4: Final data and implied estimates of suicide bombing acceptability among Muslims around the world

Country Percent not clearly speaking out against suicide bombing (100 minusthe percentage of people saying “suicide bombing never justified”(valid answers only)) Percent saying suicide bombing often/sometimes justified (valid answers only) PalestinianTerritories 64.44 51.11 Bangladesh 64.89 50.00 Mali 61.29 41.94 Ghana 51.14 34.09 Uganda 43.48 32.61 Lebanon 55.00 29.00 Tanzania 47.92 27.08 Egypt 60.82 24.74 RussianFederation 51.85 23.35 Bulgaria 40.98 23.18 Slovenia 57.10 22.11 Nigeria 29.07 22.09 Kuwait 28.13 21.88 Turkey 33.33 20.69 Ethiopia 34.07 19.78 Malaysia 34.78 19.57 Austria 36.56 18.90 Senegal 35.63 17.24 Spain 25.81 17.20 Israel 48.94 17.02 France 36.00 16.00 United Kingdom 27.08 15.63 Jordan 43.88 15.31 Belgium 27.67 14.47 Greece 15.58 12.76 Netherlands 24.19 12.56 Morocco 21.59 12.50 Sweden 27.67 12.07 Denmark 15.38 10.14 Luxembourg 21.37 9.91 Switzerland 17.19 9.49 Indonesia 21.65 9.28 Norway 15.38 8.47 Uzbekistan 14.29 7.69 Germany 14.43 7.22 Tunisia 8.16 5.10 Pakistan 6.74 3.37

Even if the given percentages are lower than may have been expected, the security risk from the sheer absolute numbers of persons potentially involved is truly staggering.

Graph 4: Estimates and projections about terror sympathy among Muslims in Russia, Israel, and in the countries of the European Union, the EEA, and EFTA

POSSIBLE DRIVERS OF PRESUMED MASS SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE

It is also absolutely vital to look at the correlations of the presumed or explicitly available terror support rates (see Table 4). The following hypotheses, based on the current study’s data and international standard cross-national data emerge and can be further scrutinized in the appendix to this study:[27]

• General support for democracy and non-violence will impede terrorism;
• Objective poor conditions further increase the potential of terrorist groups;
• The status of a country as a periphery leads to increased terrorism support, and, above all
• Terror support is driven by a particular hatred towards Israel and
• Terror support is driven by a revolutionary and backward-looking Islamist trend

The results of the current study suggest the need for improving the state of higher education in the Arab world and the Muslim world in general. While the strengthening of property rights and the respect of the law do play an important role against terror support, the matter cannot be disconnected from the issue of gender inequality in the Muslim world. The establishment and expansion of academic exchange programs and libraries as well as facilitating access to academic sources and materials in the local languages of the countries involved may be the best way to reduce support for terror. This applies in particular to such fields as the social sciences and history. The establishment of major Western universities and think-tanks in the Gulf countries is a positive step in this direction. Academic reference services, such as Thomson, Reuters, Scopus, and others would be well advised to expand their indexing of Arab and other academic journals from the region.[28] Arabic language and other news media should be translated and indexed in the data bases. During the Cold War, for example, the West knew a great deal about the Warsaw Pact countries, while research institutes and universities in the latter studied Western literature.

CALIBRATING THE RESULTS WITH DIRECT OPINION POLLS ON ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE

The first and only publicly available opinion survey data on direct and explicit Islamic State support were provided by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS).[29] These data are also further evaluated in the available data appendix to this study.[30] A principal component analysis of the available country data was performed. Even if Islamic State favorability is 24 percent in the Palestinian Territories; 10 percent or greater in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, among the Syrian refugees, and in Tunisia; and is below 10 percent in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, the answers to the other survey items are truly alarming: “Islamic State is strong because of declaring the Caliphate; Islamic State is strong because of its commitment to ‘Islamic principles,’” etc.

The data also show correlations of the imputed or documented Islamic State support rates with the aggregate data of the current study. Arab nationalism and traditional hierarchies are clear factors driving support for terrorism, while military conscription and a strong national military; democracy and non-violence; outward migration; and religious pluralism reduce terror support.[31] Table 5 and Map 3 summarize the ACRPS data and the global projections made from them:

Table 5: Islamic State terror support rates in the Arab world according to opinion survey data of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Qatar in eight Arab countries and territories. Opinions in percent of the total adult population of the given country/territory

ACRPS – % Islamic State outright rejection

ACRPS – % Islamic State outright favorability

ACRPS – % Islamic State favorability to some extent

Opinion on Islamic State positive/positive to some extent

Islamic State was created by foreign actors

Islamic State strong because of military achievements

Islamic State strong because of declaring Caliphate

Islamic State strong because of commitment to Islamic principles

Islamic State strong because of willingness to stand up to the West

Egypt

77

4

6

10

77

17

15

13

13

Iraq

81

2

4

6

74

13

7

10

7

Jordan

70

3

6

9

66

16

15

14

11

Lebanon

98

0

0

0

80

8

12

9

1

Palestinian territories

36

4

20

24

55

27

17

14

17

Saudi Arabia

70

3

6

10

65

9

12

13

7

Syrian refugees

73

4

9

13

66

16

10

16

6

Tunisia

71

7

6

13

72

10

19

14

13

Map 3: Islamic State acceptance rates among Muslim publics based on estimates from ACRPS data and PEW suicide bombing support data

Even if one were to assume a positive, downward trend in mass support for terrorism as it emerges from the Pew data, mentioned in the available appendix, it would take years, if not decades for support in the Muslim world for radical organizations like al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Hamas to come to an end, especially in the Arab countries. Strictly speaking, there are hardly any linear, let alone rapid downward observable trends in the Pew figures on support for al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Hamas, thus vindicating the arguments of those who maintain that President Barack Obama’s Middle East policy has not changed the mass support for the most radical elements in the Arab world. In addition, there has been an increase in conspiracy theories that it was not Arabs or Muslims but “evil Westerners” who carried out or engineered these international terror attacks. According to the Pew Institute, “When asked whether they think groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., most Muslims in the nations surveyed say they do not believe this. There is no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the attacks. Indeed, Muslims in Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey are less likely to accept this today than in 2006.”[32]

This replicates a finding of a 2006 Pew study:

In one of the survey’s most striking findings, majorities in Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan say that they do not believe groups of Arabs carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The percentage of Turks expressing disbelief that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks has increased from 43% in a 2002 Gallup survey to 59% currently. And this attitude is not limited to Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries – 56% of British Muslims say they do not believe Arabs carried out the terror attacks against the U.S., compared with just 17% who do.[33]

In addition, 46 percent of French Muslims, 44 percent of German Muslims, and 35 percent of Spanish Muslims flatly rejected in that survey that Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARIS AND COPENHAGEN ATTACKS

In view of the January and February 2015 Paris and Copenhagen attacks, two additional studies should be noted. A study conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence together with the BBC World Service pointed to 5,042 deaths every month as a result of Islamist political violence in 2014 on a global level.[34] The Global Terrorism Index, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, draws more long-term conclusions.[35]

As of the writing of this article, global Islamist terror death rates are 5,042 deaths per month, which would imply 60,504 deaths per year.

CONCLUSION

Standard and reliable Pew public opinion survey data available on 42 percent of the global Muslim population already come to the implicit conclusion that, on average, 17.38 percent of global Muslims openly express terror sympathies, measured by five different terror indicators. In this article, terror support rates were estimated indirectly for a number of additional countries, based on European Social Survey (ESS) data and the relationships that could be established between these ESS indicators and the aforementioned Pew studies. The implications and the cross-national correlations of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies survey on Islamic State support in eight Arab countries and territories were tested as well.

The Western world urgently needs to address not only the Islamist military challenge, but also to provide support to those forces and currents in the Arab and the Muslim world that are fighting this radicalism.

*Arno Tausch is Professor of Economics at Corvinus University Budapest, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Innsbruck University, Austria.

NOTES

[1] For a basic analysis, see Neriah Jacques, The Structure of the Islamic State (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2014), http://jcpa.org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/#sthash.2GeywYWn.dpuf and http://jcpa.org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/.

[2] Yoram Schweitzer, “ISIS: The Real Threat,” INSS Insight, No. 596, August 21, 2014, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7572.

[3] Talmiz Ahmad, “Emergence of ISIS: Implications for Regional Security,” Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, July 17, 2014,http://www.ecssr.com/ECSSR/appmanager/portal/ecssr?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=featuredTopicsPage〈=en&_nfls=false&_event=viewFeaturedTopic&ftId=%2FFeatureTopic%2FTalmiz_Ahmad%2FFeatureTopic_1812.xml

[4] Charles Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[5] “Erdogan Warns EU to Crack Down on Islamophobia,” Middle East Online, January 6, 2015, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=69569.

[6] To date, the only credible direct survey of ISIL support was provided by the Qatar-based Arab think tank, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). See “Poll: ISIS Viewed Positively by 24 Percent of Palestinians,” Haaretz, November 13, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.626318#! and “A Majority of Arabs Oppose ISIL, Support Air Strikes on the Group,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, November 11, 2014, http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/6a355a64-5237-4d7a-b957-87f6b1ceba9b. These data cover Lebanon, Egypt, Syrian refugees, Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq.

[7] See “Obama Leads Security Council to Denounce ISIS,” US News and World Report, September 24, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/24/obama-led-un-security-council-unanimously-passes-anti-isis-resolution. For a quantitative analysis of the long-run tendencies of international terrorism, see, among others: Peter J. Phillips, Terrorist Group Brutality and the Emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS), August 12, 2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2479740.

[8] On the survey by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, see, among others, “Poll: ISIS Viewed Positively by 24 Percent of Palestinians”; “Opening Session of the ACRPS Conference on the Rise of ISIL and Renewed Direct US Military Intervention,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, October 18, 2014,http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/335a0bc5-dce9-463e-ba46-af8770eecf3a; and “A Majority of Arabs Oppose ISIL.”

[9] “BBC Radio 4 Today Muslim Poll: Poll of 1,000 Muslims in Britain for BBC Radio 4 Today,” BBC Radio 4 Today, February 2015, http://comres.co.uk/polls/bbc-radio-4-today-muslim-poll.

[10] Mansoor Moaddel and Stuart A. Karabenick S, “Religious Fundamentalism Among Young Muslims in Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” Social Forces, Vol. 86, No. 4 (2008), pp. 1675-710; Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 43, Nos. 3-5 (2002), pp. 229-49; Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[11] Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East. Negative Opinions of al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah Widespread, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/ and Pew Research Center Question Search,http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/.

[12] See Arno Tausch, “A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2013), pp. 57-74,http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/12/a-look-at-international-survey-data-about-arab-opinion/; Arno Tausch, “Further Insights into Global and Arab Muslim Opinion Structures: Statistical Reflections on the 2013 PEW Report ‘The World’s Muslims,’” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2013),http://www.rubincenter.org/2014/04/further-insight-into-global-and-arab-muslim-opinion-structures-statistical-reflections-on-the-2013-pew-report-the-worlds-muslims/ and Arno Tausch, “The New Global Antisemitism: Implications from the Recent ADL-100 Data,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014),http://www.rubincenter.org/2014/09/the-new-global-antisemitism-implications-from-the-recent-adl-100-data/.

[13] Pew Research Center, Terrorism, http://www.pewglobal.org/topics/terrorism/ and “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” January 7, 2015,http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/.

[14] European Social Survey, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.

[15] Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other: Europe’s Muslims More Moderate,” Global Attitudes & Trends, June 22, 2006,http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/ and Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database, http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=950&cntIDs=&stdIDs=.

[16] Kurzman, The Missing Martyrs.

[17] Arno Tausch, Foreword Mansoor Moaddel, What 1.3 Billion Muslims Really Think: An Answer to a Recent Gallup Study, Based on the “World Values Survey,”(New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009).

[18] “Islamophobic Hate Groups Become More Prominent in Germany,” Spiegel, March 5, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/islamophobic-hate-groups-become-more-prominent-in-germany-a-956801.html and “Anti-Islam ‘Pegida’ March in German City of Dresden,” BBC News, December 16, 2014,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30478321.

[19] The Pew surveys only include persons above 18 years of age.

[20] Population and denominational statistics from Auswärtiges Amt, “Palästinensische Gebiete,”

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/PalaestinensischeGebiete.html.

[21] Differences due to rounding.

[22] For a general debate about the future of Islam in Europe, see Leslie Lebl, “The Islamist Threat to European Security,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 2014), http://www.meforum.org/3837/the-islamist-threat-to-european-security; Euro-Islam.info, http://www.euro-islam.info/; “Muslim Europe: The Demographic Time Bomb Transforming Our Continent,” Telegraph, August 8, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html.

[23] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Israel,” World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_is.pdf.

[24] Pew Research Center, “Concerns About Islamic Extremism on the Rise in the Middle East. Negative Opinions of al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah Widespread,”http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/. For analyses about Muslim antisemitism in Europe, see Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Muslim Anti-Semitism in Western Europe,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Muslim-anti-Semitism-in-Western-Europe; Yascha Mounk, “Europe’s Jewish Problem,” Foreign Affairs, September 17, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141990/yascha-mounk/europes-jewish-problem; and Jim Yardley, “Europe’s Anti-Semitism Comes Out of the Shadows,” New York Times, September 23, 2014,http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/europe/europes-anti-semitism-comes-out-of-shadows.html?_r=0.

[25] Additional details about the data used in this article are available from “Arno Tausch: Documentation for Books and Articles,” Academia.edu,https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles. Calculated from Pew International and from European Social Survey,http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.

[26] This is in stark contrast to the optimism held by the political mainstream in the European Union regarding Palestinian statehood. See “European Parliament Resolution on Recognition of Palestine Statehood,” European Parliament News, December 17, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20141212IPR01105/html/European-Parliament-resolution-on-recognition-of-Palestine-statehood.

[27] https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles

[28] For a list of country performance of article publishing in peer-reviewed journals in the social sciences contained in the world’s most comprehensive indexing system, SCOPUS, see: SCImago Journal and Country Rank, http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?area=3300&category=0&region=all&year=all&order=it&min=0&min_type=it. For the ranking of Arab Universities by international comparison, see: SCImago Institutions Rankings, http://www.scimagoir.com/research.php?rankingtype=research&indicator=Output&sector=&country=&display=table&page=2&year=2014.

[29] “A Majority of Arabs Oppose ISIL.”

[30] See Arno Tausch, Almas Heshmati, and Hichem Karoui, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2014).

[31] See Tausch, “A Look at International Survey Data About Arab Opinion,” pp. 57-74; Tausch, “Further Insights into Global and Arab Muslim Opinion Structures”; and Tausch, “The New Global Antisemitism.” The formula used to calculate global Muslim support rates for the Islamic State was based on the linear regression between the known Muslim Islamic State acceptance data from the ACPSR and the known suicide bombing support rates. The equation is: IS support = 0.2317 x suicide bombing support + 5.3948. Where there was no ACPSR data available, the known suicide bombing support rates from many countries were used to arrive at the estimates in Map 3; see also the available electronic appendix data, “Arno Tausch: Documentation for Books and Articles,” Academia.edu, https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles.

[32] Pew Research Center, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism,” Global Attitudes & Trends, July 21, 2011,http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/.

[33] Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide.”

[34] Peter R. Neumann, BBC World Service, and BBC World Monitoring, The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence and BBC World Service, 2014), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ICSR-REPORT-The-New-Jihadism-A-Global-Snapshot.pdf.

[35] Global Terrorism Index 2014, Institute for Economics and Peace,http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf.

[Boiler 46,364]

Yep

Death to the Infidels.

[ExPatty 502]

Please reference your "studies"

Pro-Tip: News articles, commentary , drudge reports and polls do not meet any bar that I would consider a study.

no way you are this ignorant.

[OriZ 3,157]

Hmmm. Sounds like some people on VJ to me:

A woman who blocked attempts to condemn Isil, attacked “Zionist-led media outlets” and suggested that violent “resistance” is the way forward in Palestine has been elected the next leader of Britain’s seven million students.

Malia Bouattia won 50.9 per cent of the vote to become president of the National Union of Students, defeating the moderate incumbent, Megan Dunn. She won despite an open letter from almost 50 Jewish student leaders saying they were “extremely concerned” by her views amid rising extremism and anti-Semitism on campus.

In her previous role as a member of the NUS’s executive committee, Ms Bouattia blocked the union from passing a motion condemning Isil, calling it “Islamophobic.” In a recent talk, she dismissed the threat of “so-called terrorism” in the UK and blamed Government anti-terrorism policy on a “Zionist and neo-con lobby.”

Ms Bouattia has criticised her alma mater, Birmingham University, as a “Zionist outpost in higher education,” saying it has “the largest Jsoc [Jewish student society] in the country.”

In new video footage obtained by The Telegraph, Ms Bouattia condemned the Israel-Palestine peace process as “strengthening the colonial project” and added: “To consider that Palestine will be free only by means of fundraising, non-violent protest and the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement is problematic…[These] can be misunderstood as the alternative to resistance by the Palestinian people.”

She said that “Zionist-led media outlets” had caused Muslims to have an “obsession of convincing non-Muslims of our non-violent and peaceful nature, so that we’re… dangerously condemning the resistance, branding groups and individuals as terrorists to dissociate from them.”

Ms Bouattia was congratulated on her victory by the extremist group Cage, which also denies terrorism and last year defended Mohammed Emwazi, the Isil executioner known as “Jihadi John.” Ms Bouattia works closely with Cage and has shared platforms in British universities with its head of outreach, the former Guantanamo inmate Moazzam Begg, at least six times in recent months.

At the meetings she has claimed that the Government’s anti-terror policy, Prevent, is “criminalising everyone” and is a symptom of Britain’s “steady descent into a police state.” She has said that students must organise to make Prevent “toxic and unworkable.”

Cage’s role in the NUS was a key issue in the presidential race. Ms Dunn, the defeated incumbent, said that the NUS would “not work with Cage,” which the union describes as a “deeply problematic organisation” whose leaders “have sympathised with violent extremism and violence against women.”

However, Ms Bouattia attacked Ms Dunn for the move, saying it was a “betrayal,” calling her comments about Cage “baseless Islamophobic smears” and claiming that “cutting ties with Cage denies NUS a wealth of experience and information in tackling Prevent.”

In 2014 Ms Bouattia, the NUS’s salaried black students’ officer, successfully opposed a move by the union’s executive to condemn Isil and express solidarity with Iraqi Kurds, saying: “We recognise that condemnation of Islamic State appears to have become a justification for war and blatant Islamophobia.”

Ms Bouattia’s remarks appearing to support Palestinian terrorism were made on 28 September 2014 at a conference entitled “Gaza and the Palestinian Revolution.” The event organiser, the Tri-Continental Anti-Imperialist Platform, has removed the video of her talk, but a copy has been obtained by The Telegraph.

On January 30 this year Ms Bouattia spoke at a meeting organised by Memo, a website closely linked to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. According to a transcript of her remarks posted on the NUS black students’ campaign’s official blog, she said: “The very issue of so-called terrorism and the language surrounding it recall back to the way in which indigenous resistance to Western colonialism was dismissed as ‘terrorism’…

Ms Bouattia was endorsed for the NUS presidency by Raza Nadim, spokesman for the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC), an extremist Muslim group which is banned from student unions by the NUS itself for its racism and anti-Semitism. She thanked Mr Nadim for his support on her campaign Facebook page.

She has claimed that “Muslims in the UK find them in a situation where their democratic freedoms have been comprehensively stripped” and that Prevent “has made being Muslim in Britain a conditional freedom,” with a “matrix of surveillance” formed to “identify ‘radicals’ in society who, for the most part, don't exist.”

Rupert Sutton, of Student Rights, a group which fights extremism on campus, said: “Bouattia has been an integral part of a campaign working alongside extremists to undermine counter-radicalisation policy on campuses. The access to student audiences this campaign has given extremist groups will now only increase.”

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/20/malia-bouattia-elected-nus-president-after-causing-controversy/

[ExPatty 502]

I don't read walls of text like rob l posted; if he can't be bothered to identify key passages I can't be bothered to read it, either. I've updated my sig, though, with an exact back up of what I said earlier. This way any time somebody needs a reminder, they will have an easy place to locate it, lest their progressive history revisionism dares challenge their grasp on reality

[Rob L 3,811]

I don't read walls of text like rob l posted; if he can't be bothered to identify key passages I can't be bothered to read it, either. I've updated my sig, though, with an exact back up of what I said earlier. This way any time somebody needs a reminder, they will have an easy place to locate it, lest their progressive history revisionism dares challenge their grasp on reality

Based on the lack of data that comes will th that outlandish claims about most Muslims are terrorists and the claims that all studies support this as fact, I thought I would level set on the definition of a study. Hence the examples. I don't think you have the studies that show that most Muslims are terrorists.

[OriZ 3,157]

I don't think he said most muslims are terrorists, but that most terrorists are muslims.

[Boiler 46,364]

Based on the lack of data that comes will th that outlandish claims about most Muslims are terrorists and the claims that all studies support this as fact, I thought I would level set on the definition of a study. Hence the examples. I don't think you have the studies that show that most Muslims are terrorists.

As nobody made that assertion not sure what your point is.

[JayJayH 546]

Please reference your "studies"

Pro-Tip: News articles, commentary , drudge reports and polls do not meet any bar that I would consider a study.

Headline:

"Isis document leak reportedly reveals identities of 22,000 recruits"

Source: The Guardian

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/isis-document-leak-reportedly-reveals-identities-syria-22000-fighters

This of course doesn't include most ISIS members, nor members of Boko Haram, Al Qaida in [the Maghreb/Arabian peninsula/wherever], Ansar-al-Islam, Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiya, Jabath al-Nusra, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Janjaweed, [fill in other militant Islamofascist organization of your choice].

Without firm, peer reviewed studies to back this up, I would argue that you'd be hard pressed to find an organized non-Islamic terrorist organization anywhere with over 22,000 members - Let alone the additional hundreds of thousands of jihadists ready to deliberately kill and maim civilians for the sake of their ideology in the name of the other plethora of Islamofascist terrorist organizations.

Thus, "most terrorists are Muslim", although politically incorrect to say, isn't factually incorrect.

Of course, the definition of "terrorism" can be debated - Though I'd argue that any of the above organizations, including all of their hundreds of thousands of fighters are, by definition, "terrorists."

I am not sure how we ever got to a point where the statement "Most terrorists are Muslim" somehow became "Most Muslims are terrorists." The two statements have absolutely nothing to do with one another and mixing them up doesn't solve anything.

Edited April 21, 2016 by JayJayH

[JayJayH 546]

My mistake - I read the post you referenced again, and I read it wrong. Apologies!

To make it clear, I agree with you, and my response was a misreading of what the previous poster had said.
Too late to edit or delete my previous post, please disregard.

I think you'd be hard pressed to make the statement "Most Muslims are terrorists" from the Pew Research data. What the data does show however, is that the wider Islamic world is centuries behind as far as basic human rights go. No non-Islamic country has apostasy laws. No non-Islamic country has the death penalty for LGBT people (though Uganda was the target of an angry international community when it passed a harsh anti-LGBT law a few years back - But it's not an Islamic country, so it's okay for the far left to loudly and publicly protest against Uganda).

What I miss from the left is an acknowledgement of the sheer size of the "religious nutjob" problem we see in the Islamic world vs. the rest of the world, and a firm stand against Islamic orthodoxy and support for moderate secular Muslims. Today, the likes of Maajid Nawaz and Sarah Haider are being called Islamophobic bigots by the far left.

In the same fashion, the right should embrace secular Muslims like Maajid Nawaz and others who are trying to reform Islam from within. Islam isn't going away, but the religion as a whole is in sore need of reformation and secularization.

Until "Islamic fundamentalism" means refusing to serve wedding cakes at a gay wedding, Islam should be subject to intense scrutiny - Particularly from the left. When "radical Muslim" is synonymous with protesting gender neutral bathrooms, no one needs police protection for blasphemy, and "crazy Muslims" are picketing abortion clinics, then we're at a place where Islam = "Just another religion."

Based on the lack of data that comes will th that outlandish claims about most Muslims are terrorists and the claims that all studies support this as fact, I thought I would level set on the definition of a study. Hence the examples. I don't think you have the studies that show that most Muslims are terrorists.

Headline:

"Isis document leak reportedly reveals identities of 22,000 recruits"

Source: The Guardian

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/isis-document-leak-reportedly-reveals-identities-syria-22000-fighters

This of course doesn't include most ISIS members, nor members of Boko Haram, Al Qaida in [the Maghreb/Arabian peninsula/wherever], Ansar-al-Islam, Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiya, Jabath al-Nusra, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Janjaweed, [fill in other militant Islamofascist organization of your choice].

Without firm, peer reviewed studies to back this up, I would argue that you'd be hard pressed to find an organized non-Islamic terrorist organization anywhere with over 22,000 members - Let alone the additional hundreds of thousands of jihadists ready to deliberately kill and maim civilians for the sake of their ideology in the name of the other plethora of Islamofascist terrorist organizations.

Thus, "most terrorists are Muslim", although politically incorrect to say, isn't factually incorrect.

Of course, the definition of "terrorism" can be debated - Though I'd argue that any of the above organizations, including all of their hundreds of thousands of fighters are, by definition, "terrorists."

I am not sure how we ever got to a point where the statement "Most terrorists are Muslim" somehow became "Most Muslims are terrorists." The two statements have absolutely nothing to do with one another and mixing them up doesn't solve anything.

Edited April 21, 2016 by JayJayH

[Boiler 46,364]

Left is a misleading term as these people have nothing to do with the Left as I understood it.

I realise Liberal in the US does not mean what it does in the UK, not that keen on that either.

Activists?