The Strategic Logic of the US-Taliban Prisoner Swap Deal

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The Strategic Logic of the US-Taliban Prisoner Swap Deal

Debates over the merits of the U.S.-Taliban prisoner swap agreement are missing the point.

By Zachary Keck

June 03, 2014

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...the main reason for the deal appears to be a desire on the part of the Taliban and the U.S. to reinvigorate their long-stalled diplomatic talks in the context of a post-Karzai Afghanistan and NATO’s troop withdrawal.

In the past, reports about a potential prisoner swap agreement with Bergdahl and Taliban commanders at Guantanamo Bay were portrayed as a trust-building measure between the Taliban and the U.S. as part of their ongoing diplomatic negotiations. This longstanding diplomatic channel reportedly broke down when Karzai publicly objected to the Taliban opening a diplomatic office in Doha, Qatar.

That a prisoner swap agreement would come now then is no surprise. Karzai is a lame duck president who is on his way out. Indeed, the run-off election to replace him will be held later this week.

It is increasingly clear that the Obama administration is using this lame duck period to set a new, more unilateral tone to its Afghan policy. The Obama administration likely understands that Washington tied itself too tightly to Karzai in the past, and he usually proved to be an unreliable partner. It wants to avoid making a similar mistake with his successor.

Thus, last week the Obama administration unilaterally announced how many U.S. troops will stay in Afghanistan after this year, as well as the pace of their withdrawal. It is now unilaterally reopening the diplomatic channel with the Taliban over the lame duck Karzai administration’s objections. This is crucial, as Karzai’s successor may very well come from a non-Pashtun ethnic group, which means he will almost certainly be more opposed to cooperating with the Taliban than Karzai has been.

For all its other shortcomings—and these undoubtedly exist—the prisoner swap agreement is a decent trust building measure. On the one hand, the agreement demonstrates that the Taliban interlocutors the U.S. is dealing with have the support of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Besides securing Bergdahl’s release, Mullah Omar came out and openly endorsed the deal. There was little reason for him to do this except to demonstrate to the U.S. side that the deal had his support ... Finally, the Taliban’s willingness to release Bergdahl demonstrates a modicum of goodwill on its part.

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Perhaps most importantly, the deal demonstrated to the Taliban that the Obama administration is willing to expend political capital at home for negotiating with the Taliban. Given persistent charges that the Obama administration subordinates foreign policy objectives—particularly in Afghanistan—to domestic politics, it was imperative that the White House demonstrate this to the Taliban before discussions over more substantive agreements could proceed.

With the prisoner swap agreement out of the way, the U.S. and the Taliban are likely beginning to pursue these more substantive talks. The U.S. side is undoubtedly hoping to persuade the Taliban to end the insurgency and join the Afghan government in some capacity.

Even if this goal proves elusive—and there’s good reason to believe it will—having an open diplomatic channel to the Taliban will remain imperative. In fact, the diplomatic channel with the Taliban will become all the more important should the Taliban take parts of southern Afghanistan in the future, either before or after all U.S. troops are out of Afghanistan at the end of 2016.

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The Afghan War was always about eliminating al-Qaeda’s leadership and preventing the transnational terrorist group from ever again using the country as a safe haven from which to mount terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its allies. A diplomatic channel with the Taliban allows the U.S. the opportunity to achieve that objective regardless of the outcome of the Afghan civil war. Should the Taliban make gains in Afghanistan after NATO leaves, Washington will almost certainly use the channel to communicate to the Taliban that it will not actively oppose its return to power so long as the Taliban denies al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups a safe haven.

This is an example of what President Obama meant when he discussed trying to hit singles and doubles rather than swinging for the fences. The U.S. may be appalled by the Taliban’s medieval governance, but it’s willing to acquiesce to it as long as the group doesn’t provide al-Qaeda leaders a home in Afghanistan.