Airsea Battle VS Offshore Control: Can the US Blockade China?

[mota bhai 2,675]

Airsea Battle VS Offshore Control: Can the US Blockade China?
By James R. Holmes

August 19, 2013

Retired Marine Corps colonel T. X. Hammes and Center for Naval Analyses researcher Elbridge Colby have been trading salvoes over the merits of AirSea Battle for the past couple of weeks. Writing over at The National Interest, Colby mounts a defense of the ASB doctrine. He maintains in effect that the U.S. armed forces must develop some way to kick in the door should China slam it shut in the Western Pacific. In his rejoinder, Hammes denies that AirSea Battle is a strategy while propounding his alternative concept of "offshore control.”

...

In a nutshell, offshore control means sealing off the first island chain to keep PLA Navy shipping from reaching the broad Pacific; waging submarine and aerial warfare to deny China access to its own offshore waters and skies; and imposing a distant blockade to bring economic pressure on Beijing. Over time, China might relinquish its goals to stop the pain. Offshore control abjures strikes at sites on the mainland — the most objectionable part of AirSea Battle — as needlessly escalatory in a campaign for limited aims.

...

The point of such strategies is to put asymmetric warfare to work for the United States and its allies, harnessing such advantages as undersea combat to exhaust the adversary without sending a limited conflict spiraling toward the nuclear threshold.

By Clausewitzian cost/benefit logic, Beijing should abandon the effort should it cost too much, drag on without end, or appear unwinnable. Let's not kid ourselves, though. Neither offshore control nor some kindred concept would bring about a quick, neat, or sure victory. If China attaches inordinate — or what looks inordinate to outsiders — value to political objects such as Taiwan or its maritime territorial claims, the Clausewitzian formula suggests Beijing may expend massive resources, indefinitely, to fulfill its goals.

...

How would such a struggle play out? One running debate among maritime strategists is whether navies win wars and, in particular, whether naval blockades can be strategically decisive. Mahan thinks so. The Mahanian algorithm instructs the good guys to vanquish the enemy's battle fleet. Battle represents a prelude to blockading his shores and doing the other things mastery of the sea empowers victorious navies to do. Corbett is a heretic by contrast, urging naval commanders to work with the army to shape events on land. For him, joint action at the land/sea interface constitutes the essence of maritime strategy.

Quoth Corbett, the only way a navy can win all by itself is through "a process of exhaustion." It can sever the enemy's economic and military lifelines and seize control of his "national life." He sounds skeptical, though, and that's because he sees a drawback. Prolonged economic warfare cuts both ways. It exhausts not just the enemy but friendly powers, not to mention one's own constituents who depend on foreign commerce for their livelihoods. Keeping the populace and the allies on the same sheet of music while their economic self-interest suffers poses a challenge, to say the least.

...

Another dimension of this debate bears mentioning. Chinese sea power fuses seagoing and shore-based assets into a single implement. PLA commanders would presumably use all assets at their disposal, sea and land, once Chinese vessels started descending to Davy Jones' locker. What if anti-ship cruise or ballistic missiles or combat aircraft flying from airfields ashore started landing heavy blows against allied fleets, whether underway or berthed in ports like Yokosuka or Sasebo? Would Washington or Tokyo really exempt land-based PLA weaponry from counterstrikes should Beijing unleash it?

If so, they would be granting the adversary one heckuva sanctuary. In short, two can escalate. Whether allied political leaders could resist popular pressure to retaliate against the source of attacks on their ships, their sons, and their daughters is a question worth pondering.

http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/08/19/airsea-battle-vs-offshore-control-can-the-us-blockade-china/

[JohnR! 5,495]

I think the real question is why would the US want to blockade China?

[mota bhai 2,675]

I think the real question is why would the US want to blockade China?

Are you one of those neo-liberals who believe war is a thing of the past?

[JohnR! 5,495]

Are you one of those neo-liberals who believe war is a thing of the past?

Considering we are not at war with China, the question still remains. Why would the US blockade China?

Edited August 19, 2013 by Gegel

[lostinblue 1,989]

When Japan had their problem with the reactors and such I was at a Toyota dealership. Customer after customer were told parts were not being shipped due to the disaster. "We will call you," when shipped.. If China does not ship to America we will be brought to our knees. (In a few weeks or less)The Chinese survived for years on a bowl of rice and plain hot water for tea. They could do it again. China has many long borders that are open to trade. A blockade is worthless.

[mota bhai 2,675]

When Japan had their problem with the reactors and such I was at a Toyota dealership. Customer after customer were told parts were not being shipped due to the disaster. "We will call you," when shipped.. If China does not ship to America we will be brought to our knees. (In a few weeks or less)The Chinese survived for years on a bowl of rice and plain hot water for tea. They could do it again. China has many long borders that are open to trade. A blockade is worthless.

So you're saying a blockade could conceivably reduce them to utter poverty?

Sounds like a win to me.

[JohnR! 5,495]

When Japan had their problem with the reactors and such I was at a Toyota dealership. Customer after customer were told parts were not being shipped due to the disaster. "We will call you," when shipped.. If China does not ship to America we will be brought to our knees. (In a few weeks or less)The Chinese survived for years on a bowl of rice and plain hot water for tea. They could do it again. China has many long borders that are open to trade. A blockade is worthless.

That is true, albeit akin to cutting off their nose in spite of their face. China needs consumers as much as we need their goods. They can't survive on their exports to other parts of the world alone. If the US were to be brought to its knees, it would do so along with Western Europe and Japan, which would result in a global financial crisis. China, along with the rest of the third world economies, would also collapse.

That is why actual question is not whether we can blockade China, so much as whether we might.

Edited August 19, 2013 by Gegel

[Jacque67 7,328]

That is true, albeit akin to cutting off their nose in spite of their face. China needs consumers as much as we need their goods. They can't survive on their exports to other parts of the world alone. If the US were to be brought to its knees, it would do so along with Western Europe and Japan, which would result in a global financial crisis. China, along with the rest of the third world economies, would also collapse.

That is why actual question is not whether we can blockade China, so much as whether we might.

impossible

[Pooky 3,786]

Considering we are not at war with China, the question still remains. Why would the US blockade China?

In the traditional sense we are not. The cyber-war is ongoing and experts believe that it is only a matter of time until this unseen war takes down a major target here in the USA.

Not that China is the only major player, but they are one of the most active.

[Darnell 8,478]

Hiya Fellas !

Tempus Fugit ...

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/21/content_16909055.htm

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/21/content_16909055.htm

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/21/content_16909055.htm