The Pipe Dream of Easy War

[mota bhai 2,675]

By H. R. McMASTER
Published: July 20, 2013

...

Our record of learning from previous experience is poor; one reason is that we apply history simplistically, or ignore it altogether, as a result of wishful thinking that makes the future appear easier and fundamentally different from the past.

We engaged in such thinking in the years before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001; many accepted the conceit that lightning victories could be achieved by small numbers of technologically sophisticated American forces capable of launching precision strikes against enemy targets from safe distances.

These defense theories, associated with the belief that new technology had ushered in a whole new era of war, were then applied to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; in both, they clouded our understanding of the conflicts and delayed the development of effective strategies.

Today, budget pressures and the desire to avoid new conflicts have resurrected arguments that emerging technologies — or geopolitical shifts — have ushered in a new era of warfare. Some defense theorists dismiss the difficulties we ran into in Afghanistan and Iraq as aberrations. But they were not aberrations. The best way to guard against a new version of wishful thinking is to understand three age-old truths about war and how our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq validated their importance.

First, war is political.

...

In the years leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, thinking about defense was driven by ideas that regarded successful military operations as ends in themselves ... believers in the theory known as the “Revolution in Military Affairs” misinterpreted the American-led coalition’s lopsided victory in the 1991 gulf war and predicted that further advances in military technology would deliver dominance over any opponent.

...

The theory was hubristic. Yet it became orthodoxy and complicated our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where underdeveloped war plans encountered unanticipated political problems ... The lesson: Be skeptical of concepts that divorce war from its political nature, particularly those that promise fast, cheap victory through technology.

Second, war is human. People fight today for the same fundamental reasons the Greek historian Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interest.

...

Over time, American forces learned that an appreciation of the fears, interests and sense of honor among Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s citizens was critical to breaking cycles of violence and helping to move their communities toward making political accommodations that isolated extremists. Reinforced security efforts, in Iraq after 2007 and Afghanistan after 2010, tried to allay fears of minorities, preserve each group’s sense of honor and convince communities that they could best protect and advance their interests through politics rather than through violence.

The hard-learned lesson: Defense concepts must consider social, economic and historical factors that constitute the human dimension of war.

Third, war is uncertain, precisely because it is political and human. The dominant assumption of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” was that information would be the key to victory. Concepts of “network-centric warfare,” “rapid, decisive operations,” “shock and awe” and “full-spectrum dominance” suggested that near-perfect intelligence would enable precise military operations and point a straight line to success. But in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptations and initiatives by the enemy. American forces, deployed initially in insufficient numbers to keep pace with the evolution of those conflicts, struggled to maintain security. The lesson: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, like all wars, were contests of will that unleashed dynamics that made future events impossible to predict.

Fortunately, in Afghanistan and Iraq, American forces adapted. For example, in 2005, in western Nineveh Province, our enemies had pitted sectarian communities against one another in a bloody civil war. In the city of Tal Afar, our cavalry regiment first sought to understand the complex environment while building trust with local Iraqi security forces and a beleaguered population. Alongside United States Special Forces and Iraqi soldiers, our troops sought not only to fight the enemy, but also to build security for civilians and promote conflict resolution among competing groups. As Tal Afar’s mayor, Najim Abdullah Abid al-Jibouri, recalled, “Our city was the main base of operations for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ...Our people were barricaded in their homes out of fear; death awaited them around every corner.” But when the Americans came, he added, “With the skill and precision of surgeons they dealt with the terrorist cancers in the city without causing unnecessary damage.”

What we learned: American forces must cope with the political and human dynamics of war in complex, uncertain environments. Wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be waged remotely.

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While emerging technologies are essential for military effectiveness, concepts that rely only on those technologies, including precision strikes, raids or other means of targeting enemies, confuse military activity with progress toward larger wartime goals. We must not equate military capabilities with strategy.

H. R. McMaster is an Army major general and the commanding officer at Fort Benning, Ga., who led the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq as a colonel in 2005 and 2006.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?_r=2&

[RGinWA 816]

Exactly...they should have the war on every night like they did during Vietnam. The distance of the conflict desensitizes people from it's actual impact; not only on our soldiers but on the collateral damage in the indigenous people and in their property.

We need to have a draft and I guarantee you that more people would be more vocal in the misuse of our nations armed forces.

Many countries have tried to beat Afghanistan and they always gave up. The terrain and the weather is just a miserable place to wage war, especially when we don't make a full assault on the country.

Arm chair generals with nothing to lose are always going to send the boys in. The bad thing is it's rarely someone that served themselves, because those that served realize there's nothing good about war, but the ending of it.

[GandD 5,966]

This is a good read. I really like stuff like this. If you guys have never seen "the fog of war" I highly suggest it. Super edited but a fun watch.

[Dan and Judy 614]

Many countries have tried to beat Afghanistan and they always gave up. The terrain and the weather is just a miserable place to wage war, especially when we don't make a full assault on the country.

We beat Afghanistan in like a month, dont remember the details, dont care to look them up. The mistake was sticking around and thinking we were going to make them our best buds. You shouldn't waste time occupying a country unless you are going to be exploiting their natural resources or getting some benefit out of being there. We are now more of

a status quo power. Not ruthless enough to make a decent profit out of war, which can be very profitable. Mostly our future wars will just drain us. as did the last two Afghanistan

and Iraq. we got squat to show for it.

[RGinWA 816]

This is a good read. I really like stuff like this. If you guys have never seen "the fog of war" I highly suggest it. Super edited but a fun watch.

I use to hate McNamara until I watched this documentary. He made a lot of sense in that film. How during a war more than just the boots on the ground wage war. It's also waged in the Government and the Pentagon. All those opinions really distort what the real goal is.

Also I had no idea about the extent of his WWII service other than a blurb about it. He was a strategist and made tough decisions. A great film.

[RGinWA 816]

We beat Afghanistan in like a month, dont remember the details, dont care to look them up. The mistake was sticking around and thinking we were going to make them our best buds. You shouldn't waste time occupying a country unless you are going to be exploiting their natural resources or getting some benefit out of being there. We are now more of

a status quo power. Not ruthless enough to make a decent profit out of war, which can be very profitable. Mostly our future wars will just drain us. as did the last two Afghanistan

and Iraq. we got squat to show for it.

Exactly. I meant as an occupying force. Nobody has been able to do that.

Iraq is now worse than when the dictator ruled it. I believe he was filling a gap...now with the gap gone the country is a war zone and we're gone.

[GandD 5,966]

We beat Afghanistan in like a month, dont remember the details, dont care to look them up. The mistake was sticking around and thinking we were going to make them our best buds. You shouldn't waste time occupying a country unless you are going to be exploiting their natural resources or getting some benefit out of being there. We are now more of

a status quo power. Not ruthless enough to make a decent profit out of war, which can be very profitable. Mostly our future wars will just drain us. as did the last two Afghanistan

and Iraq. we got squat to show for it.

We should have done some good old fashioned raping and pillaging. Not that Afghanistan had much to pillage. Still, we did better than the Russians. But then we didn't have to actively fight the afghans and Russians. So not a fair comparison.

[I AM NOT THAT GUY 5,715]

Meh. I don't take advice from the losers of a conflict.