CIA, Covert Israeli Intelligence: No Iranian Nuclear Program....

[one...two...tree 2,762]

Seymour Hersh's latest article is the very definition of required reading.

The New Yorker's surliest investigative reporter traces the administration's and intelligence agencies' internal debate on the alleged status and ambitions of Iran's nuclear program. But, just as important as these more technical issues, Hersh also records the words of those souls more familiar with the Middle East -- and Iran in particular -- who warn that Iran may well benefit from an attack, and American security receive a severe blow, as it has the potential to unite the Islamic world against a common enemy. Us.

I've pulled choice quotes but the whole thing is worth the read.

The C.I.A.'s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.

Critics who asked why Rumsfeld wasn't fired earlier, a move that might have given the Republicans a boost, were missing the point. "A week before the election, the Republicans were saying that a Democratic victory was the seed of American retreat, and now Bush and Cheney are going to change their national-security policies?" the former senior intelligence official said. "Cheney knew this was coming. Dropping Rummy after the election looked like a conciliatory move--'You're right, Democrats. We got a new guy and we're looking at all the options. Nothing is ruled out.' " But the conciliatory gesture would not be accompanied by a significant change in policy; instead, the White House saw Gates as someone who would have the credibility to help it stay the course on Iran and Iraq. Gates would also be an asset before Congress. If the Administration needed to make the case that Iran's weapons program posed an imminent threat, Gates would be a better advocate than someone who had been associated with the flawed intelligence about Iraq. The former official said, "He's not the guy who told us there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and he'll be taken seriously by Congress."

The consultant added that, for some advocates of military action, "the goal in Iran is not regime change but a strike that will send a signal that America still can accomplish its goals. Even if it does not destroy Iran's nuclear network, there are many who think that thirty-six hours of bombing is the only way to remind the Iranians of the very high cost of going forward with the bomb--and of supporting Moqtada al-Sadr and his pro-Iran element in Iraq." (Sadr, who commands a Shiite militia, has religious ties to Iran.)

In the current issue of Foreign Policy, Joshua Muravchik, a prominent neoconservative, argued that the Administration had little choice. "Make no mistake: President Bush will need to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities before leaving office," he wrote. The President would be bitterly criticized for a preëmptive attack on Iran, Muravchik said, and so neoconservatives "need to pave the way intellectually now and be prepared to defend the action when it comes."

The main Middle East expert on the Vice-President's staff is David Wurmser, a neoconservative who was a strident advocate for the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Like many in Washington, Wurmser "believes that, so far, there's been no price tag on Iran for its nuclear efforts and for its continuing agitation and intervention inside Iraq," the consultant said. But, unlike those in the Administration who are calling for limited strikes, Wurmser and others in Cheney's office "want to end the regime," the consultant said. "They argue that there can be no settlement of the Iraq war without regime change in Iran."

The "One Percent Doctrine," traced by Ron Suskind in his book of that name [VIDEO], is alive and well. If there's a one percent chance that Iran will build a bomb, that's the threshold for action. Bomb 'em boys:

A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it. The White House's dismissal of the C.I.A. findings on Iran is widely known in the intelligence community. Cheney and his aides discounted the assessment, the former senior intelligence official said. "They're not looking for a smoking gun," the official added, referring to specific intelligence about Iranian nuclear planning. "They're looking for the degree of comfort level they think they need to accomplish the mission."

But here's why attacking Iran is just plain stupid:

The former senior intelligence official added that the C.I.A. assessment raised the possibility that an American attack on Iran could end up serving as a rallying point to unite Sunni and Shiite populations. "An American attack will paper over any differences in the Arab world, and we'll have Syrians, Iranians, Hamas, and Hezbollah fighting against us--and the Saudis and the Egyptians questioning their ties to the West. It's an analyst's worst nightmare--for the first time since the caliphate there will be common cause in the Middle East." (An Islamic caliphate ruled the Middle East for over six hundred years, until the thirteenth century.)

And, as if you needed more proof that getting bogged down in Iraq was a tragic mistake:

One problem with the proposal that the Administration enlist Iran in reaching a settlement of the conflict in Iraq is that it's not clear that Iran would be interested, especially if the goal is to help the Bush Administration extricate itself from a bad situation.

"Iran is emerging as a dominant power in the Middle East," I was told by a Middle East expert and former senior Administration official. "With a nuclear program, and an ability to interfere throughout the region, it's basically calling the shots. Why should they coöperate with us over Iraq?" He recounted a recent meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who challenged Bush's right to tell Iran that it could not enrich uranium. "Why doesn't America stop enriching uranium?" the Iranian President asked. He laughed, and added, "We'll enrich it for you and sell it to you at a fifty-per-cent discount."

by Evan Derkacz

[kaydee457 13]

Seymour Hersh's latest article is the very definition of required reading.

The New Yorker's surliest investigative reporter traces the administration's and intelligence agencies' internal debate on the alleged status and ambitions of Iran's nuclear program. But, just as important as these more technical issues, Hersh also records the words of those souls more familiar with the Middle East -- and Iran in particular -- who warn that Iran may well benefit from an attack, and American security receive a severe blow, as it has the potential to unite the Islamic world against a common enemy. Us.

I've pulled choice quotes but the whole thing is worth the read.

The C.I.A.'s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.

Critics who asked why Rumsfeld wasn't fired earlier, a move that might have given the Republicans a boost, were missing the point. "A week before the election, the Republicans were saying that a Democratic victory was the seed of American retreat, and now Bush and Cheney are going to change their national-security policies?" the former senior intelligence official said. "Cheney knew this was coming. Dropping Rummy after the election looked like a conciliatory move--'You're right, Democrats. We got a new guy and we're looking at all the options. Nothing is ruled out.' " But the conciliatory gesture would not be accompanied by a significant change in policy; instead, the White House saw Gates as someone who would have the credibility to help it stay the course on Iran and Iraq. Gates would also be an asset before Congress. If the Administration needed to make the case that Iran's weapons program posed an imminent threat, Gates would be a better advocate than someone who had been associated with the flawed intelligence about Iraq. The former official said, "He's not the guy who told us there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and he'll be taken seriously by Congress."

The consultant added that, for some advocates of military action, "the goal in Iran is not regime change but a strike that will send a signal that America still can accomplish its goals. Even if it does not destroy Iran's nuclear network, there are many who think that thirty-six hours of bombing is the only way to remind the Iranians of the very high cost of going forward with the bomb--and of supporting Moqtada al-Sadr and his pro-Iran element in Iraq." (Sadr, who commands a Shiite militia, has religious ties to Iran.)

In the current issue of Foreign Policy, Joshua Muravchik, a prominent neoconservative, argued that the Administration had little choice. "Make no mistake: President Bush will need to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities before leaving office," he wrote. The President would be bitterly criticized for a preëmptive attack on Iran, Muravchik said, and so neoconservatives "need to pave the way intellectually now and be prepared to defend the action when it comes."

The main Middle East expert on the Vice-President's staff is David Wurmser, a neoconservative who was a strident advocate for the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Like many in Washington, Wurmser "believes that, so far, there's been no price tag on Iran for its nuclear efforts and for its continuing agitation and intervention inside Iraq," the consultant said. But, unlike those in the Administration who are calling for limited strikes, Wurmser and others in Cheney's office "want to end the regime," the consultant said. "They argue that there can be no settlement of the Iraq war without regime change in Iran."

The "One Percent Doctrine," traced by Ron Suskind in his book of that name [VIDEO], is alive and well. If there's a one percent chance that Iran will build a bomb, that's the threshold for action. Bomb 'em boys:

A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it. The White House's dismissal of the C.I.A. findings on Iran is widely known in the intelligence community. Cheney and his aides discounted the assessment, the former senior intelligence official said. "They're not looking for a smoking gun," the official added, referring to specific intelligence about Iranian nuclear planning. "They're looking for the degree of comfort level they think they need to accomplish the mission."

But here's why attacking Iran is just plain stupid:

The former senior intelligence official added that the C.I.A. assessment raised the possibility that an American attack on Iran could end up serving as a rallying point to unite Sunni and Shiite populations. "An American attack will paper over any differences in the Arab world, and we'll have Syrians, Iranians, Hamas, and Hezbollah fighting against us--and the Saudis and the Egyptians questioning their ties to the West. It's an analyst's worst nightmare--for the first time since the caliphate there will be common cause in the Middle East." (An Islamic caliphate ruled the Middle East for over six hundred years, until the thirteenth century.)

And, as if you needed more proof that getting bogged down in Iraq was a tragic mistake:

One problem with the proposal that the Administration enlist Iran in reaching a settlement of the conflict in Iraq is that it's not clear that Iran would be interested, especially if the goal is to help the Bush Administration extricate itself from a bad situation.

"Iran is emerging as a dominant power in the Middle East," I was told by a Middle East expert and former senior Administration official. "With a nuclear program, and an ability to interfere throughout the region, it's basically calling the shots. Why should they coöperate with us over Iraq?" He recounted a recent meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who challenged Bush's right to tell Iran that it could not enrich uranium. "Why doesn't America stop enriching uranium?" the Iranian President asked. He laughed, and added, "We'll enrich it for you and sell it to you at a fifty-per-cent discount."

by Evan Derkacz

I don't think there's much chance that the U.S. would attack Iran militarily, directly. I think the real concern is whether or not Israel will. That's what everyone should worry about.

As far as Iran being an emergent power in the middle east; they always were. There are many moderate Arab states (the U.A.E. comes to mind) that view Iran as their primary enemy so Iran's pretty much in the forefront of everyone’s agenda concerning their Nuclear program.

These moderate Arab states worry more about a Nuclear Iran than we do and so it is my opinion there'd be much back-door cooperation with these nations to try to affect a regime change in Iran.

I see regime change as the only option. Unfortunately for us though this whole Nuclear program stand-off has become a source of national pride in Iran and has diverted a lot of attention away from the regime itself.

[Marc and Olga 0]

I am starting to feel the same way I did in 2002...

I do not know what will happen since Rummy was one of those "neocons" that seem to think every country that does not agree with the US needs a regime change. I find that quite disturbing considering where that got us with Iraq.

Much like the hype about Saddam and his WMD program that lead up to our invasion, I do not feel like Iran is hiding anything.

I do not feel good about an attack on Iran...as I did not feel good about an attack on Iraq in 2003. The country I have always felt we should be going after is North Korea... THERE'S a country that "needs" a regime change.

[DeadPoolX 9]

I don't think there's much chance that the U.S. would attack Iran militarily, directly. I think the real concern is whether or not Israel will. That's what everyone should worry about.

Israel has a lot to worry about in regards to Iran. If Iran does become nuclear, and develops nuclear weaponry, then their first target may very well be Israel. I know if I were an Israeli, I'd be concerned.

While attacking Iran with the plan to hold it is completely absurd (it's just too big), calculated strikes would work. That's probably what Israel would end up doing. If the United States lacks the necessary manpower to enter and sustain a full-on war with Iran (and I'm taking about pre-Iraq invasion), there's no way Israel could hope to accomplish success in any sort of long-term ground war. So aerial strikes would probably be the best bet.

However, if Israel has its back up against the wall, and Iran continues to threaten to "wipe them off the map," you can bet Israel will do something. In fact, it's probably not a matter of "if" at all; it's probably a matter of "when."

[Hilarious Clinton 452]

Israel will use imaginary missiles to destroy Iran's imaginary nuclear weapons program.