Bob Woodward: Bush Misleads On Iraq

[w¡n9Nµ7 §£@¥€r 123]

According to Woodward, insurgent attacks against coalition troops occur, on average, every 15 minutes, a shocking fact the administration has kept secret. "It’s getting to the point now where there are eight-, nine-hundred attacks a week. That's more than 100 a day. That is four an hour attacking our forces," says Woodward.

The situation is getting much worse, says Woodward, despite what the White House and the Pentagon are saying in public. "The truth is that the assessment by intelligence experts is that next year, 2007, is going to get worse and, in public, you have the president and you have the Pentagon [saying], 'Oh, no, things are going to get better,'" he tells Wallace. "Now there’s public, and then there’s private. But what did they do with the private? They stamp it secret. No one is supposed to know," says Woodward.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/28/...in2047607.shtml

[Mirorgate 0]

I honestly hate the prostitution going on in politics these days.

[w¡n9Nµ7 §£@¥€r 123]

A senior administration official saw little new in Woodward's charges "except that Bob believes he has a lot of making up to do since the Washington establishment criticized him for being too soft in his first two books (on the Bush administration)."

"We shouldn't be surprised of another critical book about the Bush administration 40 days before an election," said the official.

[...]

The official added there was nothing revealing in Woodward's account of the daily attack numbers. "You print them all the time."

http://reuters.myway.com/article/20060929/...OODWARD-DC.html

[Trumplestiltskin 5,791]

Is he wrong though?

Just curious.

[GaryC 7]

With the press and the Dems wanting to report the bad things that happen over there I doubt if Bush is able to keep it a secret. To many witnesses that are out of his control.

Yes, you can tell an election is coming.

[kaydee457 13]

More fodder to embolden the enemy.......

[one...two...tree 2,762]

More fodder to embolden the enemy.......

Which enemy? The insurgents? When talking about emboldening enemies... maybe it's time we listen to the Iraqi people?

Poll: Iraqis Back Attacks on U.S. Troops

By BARRY SCHWEID

The Associated Press

Wednesday, September 27, 2006; 10:33 PM

WASHINGTON -- About six in 10 Iraqis say they approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces, and slightly more than that want their government to ask U.S. troops to leave within a year, according to a poll in that country.

The Iraqis also have negative views of Osama bin Laden, according to the early September poll of 1,150.

The poll, done for University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, found:

_Almost four in five Iraqis say the U.S. military force in Iraq provokes more violence than it prevents.

_About 61 percent approved of the attacks _ up from 47 percent in January. A solid majority of Shiite and Sunni Arabs approved of the attacks, according to the poll. The increase came mostly among Shiite Iraqis.

_An overwhelmingly negative opinion of terror chief bin Laden and more than half, 57 percent, disapproving of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

_Three-fourths say they think the United States plans to keep military bases in Iraq permanently.

_A majority of Iraqis, 72 percent, say they think Iraq will be one state five years from now. Shiite Iraqis were most likely to feel that way, though a majority of Sunnis and Kurds also believed that would be the case.

The PIPA poll, which included an oversample of 150 Sunni Iraqis, has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.

The State Department, meanwhile, has also conducted its own poll, something it does periodically, spokesman Sean McCormack said. The State Department poll found that two-thirds of Iraqis in Baghdad favor an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, according to The Washington Post. McCormack declined to discuss details of the department's Iraq poll.

"What I hear from government representatives and other anecdotal evidence that you hear from Iraqis that is collected by embassy personnel and military personnel is that Iraqis do appreciate our presence there," he said. "They do understand the reasons for it, they do understand that we don't want to or we don't intend to be there indefinitely."

Iraqi officials have said Iraq's security was improving and expanding throughout the country, and most U.S. troops might be able to leave eventually.

Last week, Iraqi President Jalal Talibani told the United Nations that coalition forces should remain in Iraq until Iraqi security forces are "capable of putting an end to terrorism and maintaining stability and security."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092701435.html

[kaydee457 13]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

[one...two...tree 2,762]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

So you think the insurgency is Al-Qaeda fighting our troops???

[homesick_american 1]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

So you think the insurgency is Al-Qaeda fighting our troops???

Part of it is, yes.

[one...two...tree 2,762]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

So you think the insurgency is Al-Qaeda fighting our troops???

Part of it is, yes.

Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq

* Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent in Iraq is a daunting task. Demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation.

* Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: Ba'th Party membership or affiliation with Saddam's regime, adherence to Islam, or tribal interests, values, and norms.

* Secular/ideological, tribal, and moderate Islamist concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive and often are even mutually reinforcing.

* Many ex-army officers, security force personnel, and Ba'th Party members lost their privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated. This fact, combined with the perceived humiliation of being forced to live under foreign occupation and, worse still, the prospect of longer-term Shi'i supremacy, led many to take up arms.

* In strictly economic terms, many Sunni Arab tribes suffered following the war. While a number of tribes had once earned money through large-scale transborder smuggling, such activity has become increasingly dangerous and difficult, as U.S. troops have instituted measures to cut off all unregulated cross-border movement. Additionally, some tribes that had previously relied on payments from Saddam for "good" behavior found no such patronage from the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not inclined to buy them off in this manner.

* By the end of 2003, U.S. military officials noted that some insurgents were attacking them to avenge the spilled blood of relatives, whether killed by accident or in guerilla attacks. In effect, U.S. success on the battlefield, while deterring some, had on other occasions only served to perpetuate the insurgency.

* In the last decade of Saddam's rule, many young Iraqi men, having realized that the Ba'th Party had lost its ideological coherence, turned away from the party's original ideas toward a new set of beliefs. They adopted an alternative ideology, namely, fundamentalist Islam based essentially on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

* Many young Iraqi Sunni Arabs were inspired specifically by the work of the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid. On the one hand, al-Rashid demonstrated a pragmatic approach to political action, while on the other he very clearly stated that eventually jihad with the sword is the way of the true Muslim.

* The ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis are distinct from Iraq's moderate and even some otherwise radical Islamists. While an accord may eventually be reached between a future democratic Iraqi government and moderate and certain radical Islamist groups, the beliefs of the Salafis or Wahhabis will never allow for compromise.

* The Iraqi government may be able to substantially reduce the insurgency by appealing to the secular, tribal, and non-Salafi Islamist groups through policies that address their primary concern: the status of Sunni Arabs in the new Iraq.

* Such policies should include meaningful participation in the formulation of the permanent constitution, even though Sunni Arab representation in the National Assembly is very low, and political guarantees that oil revenues will be shared equitably, that Iranian influence will not be allowed to penetrate into Iraq, that Iraq will not become an Islamic republic, and that Sunni and Shi'i Islam will be equally respected by the state. Further, steps should be taken to ensure that Sunnis (as well as Kurds, Turkomans, and Christians) are not discriminated against in the job market or in the choice of infrastructure upgrades.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.html

[homesick_american 1]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

So you think the insurgency is Al-Qaeda fighting our troops???

Part of it is, yes.

Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq

* Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent in Iraq is a daunting task. Demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation.

* Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: Ba'th Party membership or affiliation with Saddam's regime, adherence to Islam, or tribal interests, values, and norms.

* Secular/ideological, tribal, and moderate Islamist concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive and often are even mutually reinforcing.

* Many ex-army officers, security force personnel, and Ba'th Party members lost their privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated. This fact, combined with the perceived humiliation of being forced to live under foreign occupation and, worse still, the prospect of longer-term Shi'i supremacy, led many to take up arms.

* In strictly economic terms, many Sunni Arab tribes suffered following the war. While a number of tribes had once earned money through large-scale transborder smuggling, such activity has become increasingly dangerous and difficult, as U.S. troops have instituted measures to cut off all unregulated cross-border movement. Additionally, some tribes that had previously relied on payments from Saddam for "good" behavior found no such patronage from the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not inclined to buy them off in this manner.

* By the end of 2003, U.S. military officials noted that some insurgents were attacking them to avenge the spilled blood of relatives, whether killed by accident or in guerilla attacks. In effect, U.S. success on the battlefield, while deterring some, had on other occasions only served to perpetuate the insurgency.

* In the last decade of Saddam's rule, many young Iraqi men, having realized that the Ba'th Party had lost its ideological coherence, turned away from the party's original ideas toward a new set of beliefs. They adopted an alternative ideology, namely, fundamentalist Islam based essentially on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

* Many young Iraqi Sunni Arabs were inspired specifically by the work of the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid. On the one hand, al-Rashid demonstrated a pragmatic approach to political action, while on the other he very clearly stated that eventually jihad with the sword is the way of the true Muslim.

* The ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis are distinct from Iraq's moderate and even some otherwise radical Islamists. While an accord may eventually be reached between a future democratic Iraqi government and moderate and certain radical Islamist groups, the beliefs of the Salafis or Wahhabis will never allow for compromise.

* The Iraqi government may be able to substantially reduce the insurgency by appealing to the secular, tribal, and non-Salafi Islamist groups through policies that address their primary concern: the status of Sunni Arabs in the new Iraq.

* Such policies should include meaningful participation in the formulation of the permanent constitution, even though Sunni Arab representation in the National Assembly is very low, and political guarantees that oil revenues will be shared equitably, that Iranian influence will not be allowed to penetrate into Iraq, that Iraq will not become an Islamic republic, and that Sunni and Shi'i Islam will be equally respected by the state. Further, steps should be taken to ensure that Sunnis (as well as Kurds, Turkomans, and Christians) are not discriminated against in the job market or in the choice of infrastructure upgrades.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.html

And that's the other part.

There didn't seem to be a large al-Qaeda presence in Iraq until we invaded. Now they're everywhere.

Edited October 1, 2006 by homesick_american

[one...two...tree 2,762]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

So you think the insurgency is Al-Qaeda fighting our troops???

Part of it is, yes.

Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq

* Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent in Iraq is a daunting task. Demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation.

* Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: Ba'th Party membership or affiliation with Saddam's regime, adherence to Islam, or tribal interests, values, and norms.

* Secular/ideological, tribal, and moderate Islamist concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive and often are even mutually reinforcing.

* Many ex-army officers, security force personnel, and Ba'th Party members lost their privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated. This fact, combined with the perceived humiliation of being forced to live under foreign occupation and, worse still, the prospect of longer-term Shi'i supremacy, led many to take up arms.

* In strictly economic terms, many Sunni Arab tribes suffered following the war. While a number of tribes had once earned money through large-scale transborder smuggling, such activity has become increasingly dangerous and difficult, as U.S. troops have instituted measures to cut off all unregulated cross-border movement. Additionally, some tribes that had previously relied on payments from Saddam for "good" behavior found no such patronage from the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not inclined to buy them off in this manner.

* By the end of 2003, U.S. military officials noted that some insurgents were attacking them to avenge the spilled blood of relatives, whether killed by accident or in guerilla attacks. In effect, U.S. success on the battlefield, while deterring some, had on other occasions only served to perpetuate the insurgency.

* In the last decade of Saddam's rule, many young Iraqi men, having realized that the Ba'th Party had lost its ideological coherence, turned away from the party's original ideas toward a new set of beliefs. They adopted an alternative ideology, namely, fundamentalist Islam based essentially on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

* Many young Iraqi Sunni Arabs were inspired specifically by the work of the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid. On the one hand, al-Rashid demonstrated a pragmatic approach to political action, while on the other he very clearly stated that eventually jihad with the sword is the way of the true Muslim.

* The ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis are distinct from Iraq's moderate and even some otherwise radical Islamists. While an accord may eventually be reached between a future democratic Iraqi government and moderate and certain radical Islamist groups, the beliefs of the Salafis or Wahhabis will never allow for compromise.

* The Iraqi government may be able to substantially reduce the insurgency by appealing to the secular, tribal, and non-Salafi Islamist groups through policies that address their primary concern: the status of Sunni Arabs in the new Iraq.

* Such policies should include meaningful participation in the formulation of the permanent constitution, even though Sunni Arab representation in the National Assembly is very low, and political guarantees that oil revenues will be shared equitably, that Iranian influence will not be allowed to penetrate into Iraq, that Iraq will not become an Islamic republic, and that Sunni and Shi'i Islam will be equally respected by the state. Further, steps should be taken to ensure that Sunnis (as well as Kurds, Turkomans, and Christians) are not discriminated against in the job market or in the choice of infrastructure upgrades.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.html

And that's the other part.

There didn't seem to be a large al-Qaeda presence in Iraq until we invaded. Now they're everywhere.

Says who?

[Mr. Big Dog 10,747]

This isn't about the Iraqi people....It's about the war on terror- and Al Queda..

Nice. At least you acknowledge that which the administration fails (or rather refuses) to acknowledge: It isn't about the Iraqi people. Thanks so much for clearing that up. And you're right, it isn't about the Iraqi people. It never was, it never will be. They're just kind of in the way. Which might just be the main reason why they hate us so much and why a majority of them feels that it is okay to attack and kill American troops -or really any Americans - on their soil. Making lots of progress on the hearts and minds front. No, no. Not us.

Good that the "Iraqi insurgency" has been in it's last throes for a year and a half now...

[Trompe le Monde 1,107]

It's funny how woodward is not a prostitute emboldening our enemies when he does writes nice things about the bush white house, is unparalleled access to cheney, andrew card, etc., ignores what he knows about the valerie plame affair, etc.