No ruling in hearing over Arizona immigration law

[mawilson 2,133]

The Hiibel case (a ####### ruling) irks my chimes.

Mine too. I followed the case very closely and was very disappointed when the court ruled against him.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Not necessarily. Judicial decisions make law. Hibel exists because a suspect believed that his rights had been violated, but the court found for the police officer instead. There is no reason to indulge in absolutism, as you are doing, because that doesn't work in the legal field. Having worked in legal arenas for three decades, I subscribe to incrementalism, and don't take for granted that I am safe doing "just enough" for law enforcement. Law is not settled territory.

I was stopped for speeding once, and was asked to produce my auto insurance card. The one I was carrying was expired, so, I ws given a court date to appear and prove that I had current insurance. Did the officer take my word that I was insured? No, he didn't have to; I had to prove it. I also had to prove who I was when I got to court. A court date is a kind of detention in that it is mandatory. A verbal verification was not sufficient.

Most of us are law abiding and not experienced with the kind of authority law enforcement exercises or how it ramps up as you pass through levels of interaction. Doing "just enough" is, in reality, naive, and can engender attorney and court costs, and find you helping to make new law.

Hibel exists because the law was vague. The states have now clearly outlined in a law what constitutes as identification. If the police go beyond this then they break these specific laws. Period.

Your auto insurance example doesn't match this discussion because the law is that you must have physical proof on your person.

[Sofiyya 1,687]

You are absolutist in your view of law, and that limits your thinking about this issue and how law is made and interpreted. Lawyers, judges and legislators don't think as you do. You can throw statutes at me all day, and the result is the same; Hibal allows police to ask for ID, so their butts are covered.

The law is not as cut and dried as you believe. If you reread my original post re Hibel, you will see that SCOTUS allows for detention if ID cannot be produced. If a police officer does detain a person for not having it, the statutes do not trump Hibel; they merely reflect the wishes of local government.

What do you think would happen if someone sues over being detained for not producing ID? A court would rule that Hibel allows it, that SCOTUS does not find such a practice to be unlawful. What remedy would the plaintiff get? Any right under the Constitution that they believe they have not to produce ID has been redefined by Hibel.

So, you either understand how this works in the real world, or keep clinging to statutory law that is, for all intents and purposes, was superseded prior to it's enactment.

Edited July 27, 2010 by Sofiyya

[slim 1,533]

Your auto insurance example doesn't match this discussion because the law is that you must have physical proof on your person.

And you don't need auto insurance at all times... just when you're driving!

Keep in mind too there's a big difference between being detained until identified and being arrested.

There is a recourse for being improperly detained, but that's always going to be after the fact and it's almost always going to result in a loss for the detained. Plain and simply put, if the police want to identify you, you have to be identified.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

You are absolutist in your view of law, and that limits your thinking about this issue and how law is made and interpreted. Lawyers, judges and legislators don't think as you do. You can throw statutes at me all day, and the result is the same; Hibal allows police to ask for ID, so their butts are covered.

The law is not as cut and dried as you believe. If you reread my original post re Hibel, you will see that SCOTUS allows for detention if ID cannot be produced. If a police officer does detain a person for not having it, the statutes do not trump Hibel; they merely reflect the wishes of local government.

What do you think would happen if someone sues over being detained for not producing ID? A court would rule that Hibel allows it, that SCOTUS does not find such a practice to be unlawful. What remedy would the plaintiff get? Any right under the Constitution that they believe they have not to produce ID has been redefined by Hibel.

So, you either understand how this works in the real world, or keep clinging to statutory law that is, for all intents and purposes, was superseded prior to it's enactment.

Are not police accountable to the laws of their local government?

[Pooky 3,844]

Are not police accountable to the laws of their local government?

If the SCOTUS has a precedent which is at odds with local government, I believe the Supreme Court precedent holds sway.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

If SCOTUS rules that police can taser someone running away, but later a state makes a law saying that in their state police may only taser in self defense are you telling me that the police can ignore their state law?

[Pooky 3,844]

If SCOTUS rules that police can taser someone running away, but later a state makes a law saying that in their state police may only taser in self defense are you telling me that the police can ignore their state law?

A very simplistic question, which I believe carries with it a very complex answer. One that I a non-lawyer like me can't hope to do justice. Sorry.

[slim 1,533]

If the SCOTUS has a precedent which is at odds with local government, I believe the Supreme Court precedent holds sway.

Kind of. It can still be "illegal" in a local jurisdiction but a defendant can always cite the SCOTUS ruling in their defense.

If SCOTUS rules that police can taser someone running away, but later a state makes a law saying that in their state police may only taser in self defense are you telling me that the police can ignore their state law?

Kind of. (See the beauty in the levels of jurisdiction?) The police would have a good defense to ignore their state's law but would still be breaking the law.

Pre-emption doesn't necessarily make something legal. Here in Cincinnati, for instance, I'm not allowed to own an AK-47 because that violates my city's ordinances. However, under Ohio law and Federal law, I can.

The police will still enforce the law because it's still on the books but when I go to court my case will get dismissed and my rifle will be returned. Who'll pay for my time off work, legal fees, etc.? Well, your guess is as good as mine?

The other interesting question that arises from that... if they release me with my AK-47 and I come straight home... are they just going to arrest me again?

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

In my mind there are only two ways that a legal precedent for ID requirements could come about.

1. A state decides to interpret Hibel in that way and requires ID in a new law. Then a person is arrested and it goes to court and the decision is made.

2. A state without an identification law arrests a person with no ID but they verbally give their name and it goes to court.

Edited July 27, 2010 by Sousuke

[Sofiyya 1,687]

Hibel has already set precedent for producing ID: states simply have the choice to lower the bar or not. However, lowering the bar via statute does not roll back the clock or recover the allowance that SCOTUS has provided for requiring ID, so no police would be in violation of a suspects right if they demanded ID.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Isn't this discussion actually mute anyway? I read the case and it appears to have defined exactly what is required in terms of identification, see bold.

HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

No. 03-5554. Argued March 22, 2004--Decided June 21, 2004

Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a reported assault. Nevada's "stop and identify" statute requires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances to identify himself. The state intermediate appellate court affirmed, rejecting Hiibel's argument that the state law's application to his case violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: Petitioner's conviction does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on self-incrimination. Pp. 3-13.

(a) State stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. They vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 167-171, this Court invalidated a traditional vagrancy law for vagueness because of its broad scope and imprecise terms. The Court recognized similar constitutional limitations in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, where it invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds, and in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, where it invalidated on vagueness grounds California's modified stop and identify statute that required a suspect to give an officer "credible and reliable " identification when asked to identify himself, id., at 360. This case begins where those cases left off. Here, the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, Hiibel has not alleged that the Nevada statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. This statute is narrower and more precise. In contrast to the "credible and reliable" identification requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce a driver's license or any other document. If he chooses either to state his name or communicate it to the officer by other means, the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. Pp. 3-6.

(b) The officer's conduct did not violate Hiibel's Fourth Amendment rights. Ordinarily, an investigating officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 216. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34. The Nevada statute is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures because it properly balances the intrusion on the individual's interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654. An identity request has an immediate relation to the Terry stop's purpose, rationale, and practical demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing neither its duration nor its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively that the statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious, thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct. These familiar concerns underlay Kolender, Brown, and Papachristou. They are met by the requirement that a Terry stop be justified at its inception and be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the initial stop. Terry, 392 U. S., at 20. Under those principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U. S. 811, 817. The request in this case was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 6-10.

© Hiibel's contention that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on self-incrimination fails because disclosure of his name and identity presented no reasonable danger of incrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 598, and protects only against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445. Hiibel's refusal to disclose was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish evidence needed to prosecute him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486. It appears he refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer's business. While the Court recognizes his strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him. Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555. If a case arises where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved here. 10-13.

118 Nev. 868, 59 P. 2d 1201, affirmed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.

Seems very clear cut to me.

Edited July 27, 2010 by Sousuke

[Sofiyya 1,687]

You keep saying clear cut. There is little clear cut about law or the judiciary and legislators

could take extended vacations and part time jobs.

[slim 1,533]

There is little clear cut about law or the judiciary and legislators

could take extended vacations and part time jobs.

If they would take vacation and part time jobs, the law would be a lot clearer.

There was no problem with the law until they started doctoring it up.

[Sofiyya 1,687]

If they would take vacation and part time jobs, the law would be a lot clearer.

There was no problem with the law until they started doctoring it up.

No argument there