Sharon's Terror Child

[one...two...tree 2,762]

How the Likud Bloc Mid-wifed the Birth of Hamas

By RAY HANANIA

Hamas is considered one of Israel's greatest threats, but the Islamic terrorist organization found its beginnings in the misguided Israeli effort to encourage the rise of a religious alternative that would undermine the popularity of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Yasir Arafat.

The strategy resulted in the birth of Hamas which rose from these Islamic roots. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was a member of the government when the policy was developed in the late 1970s.

Although Sharon and his Likud (formerly Herut Party) government colleagues could not anticipate that the Islamic leaders they backed would eventually evolve into Hamas and suicde bombings, the two have benefited from each other's extremism over the years.

The Likud strategy to promote an Islamic alternative evolved in response to Arafat's transformation from a revolutionary leader to the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. Arafat was anointed as the only person who could negotiate for the return of the Occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Arab East Jerusalem at the Rabat Arab Summit in October 1974.

In addition to hoping to turn the Palestinian masses away from Arafat and the PLO, the Likud leadership believed they could achieve a workable alliance with Islamic, anti-Arafat forces that would also extend Israel's control over the occupied territories. At the time, the Islamicization of the Palestinian leadership was still very much in its infancy.

But the Islamic Palestinian leaders viewed the relationship with Israel differently. They were eager to accept Israel's financial backing and an easing on their activities, but only because they feared that Arafat would sign away Palestinian land captured by Israel in 1948.

If Arafat's weakness was the lack of a long term vision and an inability to resist short term achievements, his Islamic foes always believed that the struggle to liberate Palestine was a long term, slow process.

Violence was always a part of that picture. The Palestinian Islamic groups turned to violence during the first Intifadah in 1987. The Intifadah (1987- 1993) literally began as an uncontrolled, unplanned explosion of Palestinian frustrations and it gave the Islamicists their first opportunity to attract popular support.

Although Arafat remained the most popular Palestinian leader, he was still in Tunisia when the first Intifadah exploded in 1987. As Palestinians fought back against Israel's occupation, Sheik Yassin decided it was time to launch an armed wing, Hamas, to seek to lead that armed struggle against Israel's military.

Eventually, though, Hamas evolved into a much more extremists movement, not only targeting Israeli military. Hamas initially turned to the more extreme form of violence, suicide bombings, as a means of retribution for egregious Israeli attacks against Palestinians.

The first Hamas suicide bombing occurred in April 1994 in response to the massacre of 29 Muslims months earlier who were praying at the Hebron Mosque. The number of Hamas suicide bombings only steadily increased since, bringing the Middle East today to its worst crisis in decades.

Later, in the second Intifadah, suicide bombings became the weapon of choice as more and more Palestinians turned away from Arafat's secular solution through compromise with Israel and toward faith-based religious fanaticism.

The failure of the peace process to achieve a workable compromise, the new Intifada or "Palestinian rebellion," the increased terrorism and suicide bombings, and changes in how the world views political violence and terrorism since Sept. 11th have all given Likud and the Sharon government a new mandate.

Angered by the suicide bombings, the Israeli public has given Sharon wide latitude to forcefully respond to Hamas violence and the intifada. He has eagerly pursued this mandate as a front to achieve his real political agenda to undermine Arafat and to prevent Israel from accepting a peace accord that results in the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

Ironically, this is Sharon's second try to destroy Arafat. He led the Israeli army assault on the PLO in Lebanon and Beirut in 1982, but that ended in embarrassment for Israel when the army unilaterally retreated. Sharon left with his reputation tarnished, blamed for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

As the peace process collapsed and as Hamas terrorism increased, Sharon's agenda found new life. In September 2000 Sharon went to the Haram al-Ash Sharif (Temple Mount). Although events had been set in motion by the collapse of peace, Sharon;s visit and his declaration that Jerusalem will forever be the capitol of Israel sealed the fate of the unavoidable violence that consumes Palestinians and Israelis today.

more...

http://www.counterpunch.org/hanania01182003.html

[mawilson 2,133]

Just like the Taliban is America's "terror child". Nothing new.

Israel created the monster and it's their responsibility to destroy the monster.

[Hilarious Clinton 452]

If Hamas stops sending suicide bombers, shooting mortars and rockets at civilians, none of this would matter. So is their religion violence prone?

[one...two...tree 2,762]

If Hamas stops sending suicide bombers, shooting mortars and rockets at civilians, none of this would matter. So is their religion violence prone?

Religion is used as an excuse or catalyst, but the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel is geo-political.

[one...two...tree 2,762]

(excellent read)

On Friday, Hamas had terminated its unilateral truce with the Israelis. The decision was accompanied by rockets fired into Israel and claims by Hamas that it had longer-range rockets capable of striking even deeper into the country. The Israelis responded with a massive attack that was designed to smash Hamas’ infrastructure, impose heavy penalties on Gaza for Hamas’ decision, and attempt to preempt not only rocket attacks but also a new campaign of suicide bombers. Whether the campaign will achieve Israel’s goals or trigger an escalation from the Hamas side is now the issue. What is not at issue is that a new round of fighting in Gaza had been expected for weeks. Hamas had made it clear that it was going to end the truce, and Israel had made it clear that it would consider the war resumed and respond accordingly. The first question is why Hamas chose to end the truce, opening the door to an Israeli attack. The answer might lie in the fact that Palestinian elections are coming up. While Hamas was a pure opposition party, it was an effective critic of Fatah’s governance. But having been responsible for Gaza for a while, Hamas now bears criticism for the conditions there, and thus the party’s popularity had slipped. Having failed to make significant inroads into the West Bank — where Fatah dominated — and having drawn criticism for its administration in Gaza, Hamas saw its momentum blunted.

Hamas was much more effective as a combat party, fighting the Israelis, than as an administrative party dealing with the intractable problem of Gaza. The longer it remained passive toward the Israelis and the longer it remained responsible for Gaza, the less it was likely to appeal to Palestinian voters. Hamas made a strategic decision to re-establish its credentials as the only Palestinian force effectively fighting Israel. In doing so, it also reinforced the perception of Fatah as collaborating with the Israelis (and an Israeli attack is also a mechanism to prompt Palestinians to rally behind Hamas). From Hamas’ point of view — facing a hopeless situation governing Gaza and a showdown with Fatah — ending the truce made sense in the long term, on the premise that a conventional attack by Israel would not decisively break Hamas’ capability.

The Israeli response was also, on one level, driven by public opinion. Hamas’ ability to attack Israeli positions with rockets, or potentially to launch another round of suicide bombings in Israeli population centers, was quite real. If it happened, Israeli public opinion not only would create a crisis for any Israeli government, but also would strengthen those forces that felt that any peace process with the Palestinians was impossible.

Ehud Olmert, still prime minister pending a new government, saw the Hamas move as an opportunity. Hamas created a situation that had to be dealt with. Waiting for his successor to deal with the problem would bog that successor down in an issue with the international community that would cripple any ongoing diplomacy. Launching a security campaign as a lame-duck prime minister takes the issue off his successor’s plate. In an odd way, this increases the chance of some sort of settlement with the Palestinians, by allowing Olmert to be cast as a villain.

If this seems more complicated than it should be, that is not an incorrect impression. Underneath all of this is a core reality: A Palestinian state on the 1948 borders is an impossibility for both Palestinians and Israelis. For the Palestinians, it would mean a state divided physically between Gaza and the West Bank, without an independent economic foundation. It would be a fiasco. For the Israelis, the 1948 borders would allow the Palestinians to rocket Tel Aviv easily, with no guarantee that a Palestinian state would or could put a stop to it. The Palestinians need more than the 1948 borders, and the Israelis can’t even give that.

Therefore, the current cycle of violence is simply one of many such cycles that are hardwired into the geography of Israel and Palestine and from which there is no escape. It is almost unnecessary to go through the political reasoning that has led each side to this point, except to explain why it is happening now instead of earlier or later. The politics simply determine the time and shape of conflict. Geography determines that the conflict is intractable.

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary...tinian_fighting

[DeadPoolX 9]

If Hamas stops sending suicide bombers, shooting mortars and rockets at civilians, none of this would matter. So is their religion violence prone?

Religion is used as an excuse or catalyst, but the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel is geo-political.

You're probably correct, but so long as religion is a motivator (which it is), the violence won't stop.

[Saddle Bronc 124]

If Hamas stops sending suicide bombers, shooting mortars and rockets at civilians, none of this would matter. So is their religion violence prone?

Well, LS, the answer is a complicated "yes".

The religion:

• was founded/established by a goonda (brigand)
• has been riven by sectarian strife since the 656 AD Battle of Basra
• has produced the most rulers who imposed forcible conversions (or pilgrimage taxes) on subject peoples of other religions (and, in Sub-continent--this led to rebellion by subject peoples and collapse of ruling dynasties)
• is the only one where the propaganda "....you
  mohajirs and Punjabis

  are descendants of forced converts and thus heroes, while

  Bengalis

  are descendants of voluntary converts and thus cowards

• has been known for two very prominent internecine conflicts (details below)which have claimed more lives (both numbers and percentage-wise) than the 1618-1648 Thirty Years War in Central Europe

Internecine conflicts specific:

• 1971's "Operation Searchlight", mounted by Pakistani government against (then) Eastern wing of the country; 3.5 million massacred by Pakistan Army (and supporting razakar goonda-militias), of which 2.3 million (2/3) were Muslims
• Darfur conflict, ongoing since 2003, where 250,000 Africans (cent-percent Muslims) have been massacred by Sudan's "Arab" army troops and goonda-militias

[alienlovechild 75]

Angered by the suicide bombings, the Israeli public has given Sharon wide latitude to forcefully respond to Hamas violence and the intifada. He has eagerly pursued this mandate as a front to achieve his real political agenda to undermine Arafat and to prevent Israel from accepting a peace accord that results in the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

Ironically, this is Sharon's second try to destroy Arafat. He led the Israeli army assault on the PLO in Lebanon and Beirut in 1982, but that ended in embarrassment for Israel when the army unilaterally retreated. Sharon left with his reputation tarnished, blamed for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

As the peace process collapsed and as Hamas terrorism increased, Sharon's agenda found new life. In September 2000 Sharon went to the Haram al-Ash Sharif (Temple Mount). Although events had been set in motion by the collapse of peace, Sharon;s visit and his declaration that Jerusalem will forever be the capitol of Israel sealed the fate of the unavoidable violence that consumes Palestinians and Israelis today.

A six year-old article blaming a guy who has been dead for nearly three years for the violence today. Lame. Sharon and Arafat are both dead but the fight goes on because there's always an excuse.

[one...two...tree 2,762]

Angered by the suicide bombings, the Israeli public has given Sharon wide latitude to forcefully respond to Hamas violence and the intifada. He has eagerly pursued this mandate as a front to achieve his real political agenda to undermine Arafat and to prevent Israel from accepting a peace accord that results in the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

Ironically, this is Sharon's second try to destroy Arafat. He led the Israeli army assault on the PLO in Lebanon and Beirut in 1982, but that ended in embarrassment for Israel when the army unilaterally retreated. Sharon left with his reputation tarnished, blamed for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

As the peace process collapsed and as Hamas terrorism increased, Sharon's agenda found new life. In September 2000 Sharon went to the Haram al-Ash Sharif (Temple Mount). Although events had been set in motion by the collapse of peace, Sharon;s visit and his declaration that Jerusalem will forever be the capitol of Israel sealed the fate of the unavoidable violence that consumes Palestinians and Israelis today.

A six year-old article blaming a guy who has been dead for nearly three years for the violence today. Lame. Sharon and Arafat are both dead but the fight goes on because there's always an excuse.

Cause and effect, alc. The rise of Hamas to power wasn't simply because the Palestinian people wanted it to or that they don't want a peaceful coexistance with Israel. That's the conventional notion among many hawkish, armageddon-bent neo-cons who believe the whole conflict is between the Palestinians and Israel is a religious one rather than a geo-political one.